

A SEA TURNED RED BY BLOOD

LEPANTO

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 7TH, 1571



PLAYERBOOK

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EXAMPLES

1. ARTILLERY FIRE

Provana activates and decides to attack the Hassan Bey's Group in front of him.

He moves (yellow arrows) the Duodo's Galleass from 2112 to 2113, 2014 and stops in 1904. As he didn't stop before the bows of Rhodes 2 and Rhodes 1 no reaction fires are triggered. He stops instead on the side of Rhodes 1 and performs an Artillery fire attack.

So it's 8 (fire value base) $- 5$ (Rhodes1 HV) = 3 , that is multiplied $\times 2$ as the Galleass is firing a broadside.

Then we have $6 + 3$ (target's flank aspect) = 9 , plus 2 (the leader's rating) = 11 .

Duodo rolls a "5" and hits Rhodes 1 two times.

Rhodes 1 performs an HV check for the first hit and rolls a "2", passing it. It then rolls on the "Minor damage table" (16.12) and rolls a "2", obtaining an "Adrift" result. Because the squadron did not surrender, sunk, or fled away, Rhodes 1 must now repeat the check for the second hit.

The HV check is a "6", so it failed the test. This brings Rhodes 1 to the "Major damage table", where it rolls a "4", "Adrift" again, so its drifting is

of two hexes instead of one. Rhodes 1 goes to 1915 and then to 1816.

Now Provana orders his Lanterna in 2212 (red arrows) to move to 2314.

Fearing an Artillery attack Hassan Bey replies ordering Reaction fire.

The Kapudana "Dromos reis" fires with its poor 2 base value, minus 5 of the Provana's HV, minus 2 because the attacker is in the defender's arc of fire. The odd column is the $0-2$ and Dromos reis rolls a "3", no effect.

Jaffar Celebin now fires. The odds calculation is the same, but lucky Jaffar rolls a "6", putting Provana's Lanterna on fire and preventing its Artillery attack. Undaunted, Provana now orders The Squadron "Provana 1" to attack the hex 2215 (green arrows). Hassan Bey retries the "reaction fire" trick. The "Hassan Pasha" Kapudana, with the old Bey aboard, fires: 2 (base value) + 2 (Hassan's rating is 3 , but + 2 maximum allowed) minus $4=0$, minus $2=-2$.

Hassan Fires on the $0-2$ but its "3" is uneventful.

The same happens with the Kapudana "Hassan Bey", that rolls a "2".



Now it's time for "Provana 1". The squadron aims to the Kapudana "Hasan Bey" that has no leader aboard. Its 12 base value, minus 5 of the target's HV and minus 2 of the frontal aspect brings an odds of 6, so the column is 3-6. The squadron rolls a "6" inflicting a "1M" damage.

The "mast down" marker goes on the "Hasan Bey" that now must resolve the hit received.

The HV check (5 base value) goes badly: the die roll is "5" that, with a +1 of the "Mast down" marker, goes to "6" and the check is failed.

So now the Kapudana rolls on the "Maior damage table" and rolls... "2"! Sunk!

The glorious ship disappears under the waves with all hands.

2. RAMMING

In this example, Provana activates and decides to attack the Hassan Bey's Group in front of him, this time by a Ramming attack.

He moves (red arrow) the Giustiniani's Lanterna against the Hassan Bey's Kapudana in 2015.



The HV of Giustiniani's ship is 4, and that of the Hassan Bey's Kapudana is 5.

The players go to the Ramming Track , on the side of the map, and place the Ramming ship's marker in the "1" box and the Target's marker in the corresponding box on the opposite end of the track. As per rule 6.2, the ramming attacker rolls a die, adding its HV value and subtracting the enemy's HV.

Giustiniani rolls a "4" minus 1 (the difference of the HV of the ships involved) = 3.

The Ramming Ship marker advances to the "3" box but cannot reach the target.

Hassan Bey's Kapudana performs an Emergency Maneuver roll, and its "5" turns its bow against the bow with the attacker.

As this is the first attacker die roll, no reaction fire is allowed.

Then Giustiniani rolls again, this time a "5", minus 1 for the HV difference and minus another 1 because of the target's EMR result.

The net result of 3 is added to the first attempt's 3, making 6 – the ramming ship reaches its target.

At the last moment before the impact, the Hassan Bey Kapudana discharges its guns point blank against the Christian ship.

The die roll is "5", and a "Mast down" damage marker is placed on the Giustiniani's ship on the map.



This cannot stop the ramming vessel, which hits the enemy.

As the total ramming speed is 6, the final result of the ramming attack is "Check fire".

Hassan Bey rolls a "3" on the Ramming Fire Table, so No Effect.

As the attacker failed to inflict any damage on the defender's ship, the Giustiniani's Lanterna moves 1 hex beyond the target's and ends the attack in 2016.

Now it's time to Provana, aboard his Capitana, to attack. He starts in hex 2213, proceeds to 2214 and enters in 2114 (yellow arrows).



The Capitana has an HV of 5 and the defender, Jaffar's Kapudana, has a "4".

Markers are placed on the Ramming Track and the ramming procedure starts.

Provana rolls a 3, +1 (the HV difference) = 4.

The target is not reached and performs an EMR.

The EMR roll is "2", and Jaffar fails. The target marker remains in the starting position.

Now Provana makes his second attempt and rolls a "4", +1 for the HV difference = 5.

The target is reached.

Jaffar tries another desperate EMR and rolls a "2".

Failed again! Jaffar's Kapudana is hit in the flank.

As the total ramming speed is $5 + 4 = 9$ a check on the Ramming Table shows that the Kapudana receives a "Mast down" marker.

Provana managed to damage the enemy, so the ship terminates the attack in the enemy's Hex.

Provana now must decide whether he wants to grapple the enemy or not.

He chooses to grapple, hoping for a successful boarding and, because the ramming was successful, the grappling is automatic.



3. BOARDING

Later in the turn, a "Boarding" chit is drawn, and so all engaged units must resolve their boardings.

Provana is still grappled to Jaffar Bey's Kapudana.

Both players roll a die for the initiative.

The Christian leader rolls a "5", plus its HV of 5 = 10.

Jaffar Bey rolls a "5" too, but its HV is only 4 and so the Christian is the attacker.

Provana now rolls on the Boarding Table, 16.08.

He rolls a "4", -2 for the Leader's rating (the maximum modifier is +/- 2) = 2.

The table result, "4", means that now Provana must make a second die roll, succeeding if the result is in the 1-4 range.

The second die roll is "3", (no modifiers here), so Jaffar Bey's Kapudana is captured!

The Centre Wing (Jaffar Bey's Group belongs to Centre Wing) loses 2 points on its "LMA/LF" track.

Now the Leader Provana, who valiantly conducted the boarding, must roll on the Leader casualty table, 16.09.

He rolls a "4" so he's wounded. He will return in play after 2 turns, so his marker is placed 2 turns ahead on the Turn record track on the map.





Giorgio Vasari e aiuti, La battaglia di Lepanto, 1572-73

LEPANTO

OCTOBER 7, 1571

1. INTRODUCTION

At the end of the XV century, the main European Power was Spain. The American colonies wealth constituted the base of its military power and the reason for which Charles I was the ruler of the Holy Roman Empire, this implicating a Spanish military control over most parts of the western Europe.

Catholic France didn't wish at all that Charles could become the flag of the Catholic Church, while Pope Clemens VII feared whoever held enough political power to threaten his "holy" authority. After the unlucky papal intervention (by organizing the Holy League of Cognac, defeated in May 1527), Charles, who borrowed the good Genoese fleet, tried to get control of the western Mediterranean. In 1530, he forced pope Clemens to call him Emperor of The Holy Roman Empire and, at the same time, king of Italy.



Philip II of Spain

All these inside struggles, among the Christian nations, were a good opportunity for Turks, also wanting to consolidate their influence beyond the Middle East. In the first two decades of the

XVI century, Ottomans Turks reached territories spreading from Persia (Iran) till Egypt, and, therefore, their attention turned westwards against the querulous Europeans. Suleiman Ist ("the Magnificent") invaded the Balkans, conquered Belgrad in 1521, defeating Hungarians at Mohacs (1526) and attacking also Vienna in 1529. Even if the seize of Vienna was impossible to obtain, the Turks now controlled most part of the south-eastern Europe. Around 1530, therefore, the Ottoman empire threatened Europe both on earth and at sea, but, from 1530 till 1540, infrequent naval battles maintained the balance of powers.

In 1556, Charles abdicated and left either the throne of Spain (leaving it to his son Phillip II), either the Holy Roman Empire, leaving this to his brother Ferdinand. Under Phillip, Spain seized The Netherlands, the Frank County, at the French borders, the islands of Sardinia and

Sicily in the Mediterranean and the most of the Italian peninsula. The Phillip and Spain were involved in a lot of religious questions (protestants of the northern Europe, Muslims in Spain forced to become Christians etc.) In 1568, Phillip sent his stepbrother, Don Juan de Austria, to contain an Islamic insurrection; the Christian success increased a bad temper between Spain and the Turks, which now were ruled by Selim, son of Suleiman. Although the Ottomans believed it was appropriate to keep an alliance with the Most Serene Republic of Venice, their aims against the island of Candia (Cyprus) inevitably led towards a sea struggle in the eastern Mediterranean. Venice was at bay and called for help. Now, at Rome, a new pope, Pious V, was the only ruler to get the venetian call to arms. The Pope was simply fearing the increasing Muslim power and persuaded a reluctant Phillip to enroll an Holy Alliance, renewing the spirit of the Crusades.

After a long debating congress, the Holy League was formed in May 1571. The main disagree was about who had to command the League. Venice did not want a complete control of Spain and vice versa. A good compromise was again the contribution of

Don Juan, a leader who had the respect and good assessment by all the allies. While Venice wanted mainly to defend Candia and Crete and Spain wanted a complete defeat of the Islamic Pirates (western Mediterranean), the Pope convinced all to raise a total war against the powerful Turks.

The fleets gathered together at Messina, Sicily, where Don Juan assumed the command of over 300 ships.

Just over half of the galleys in the combined Christian fleet which fought at Lepanto were Venetian, some 108 out of 206 or roughly 52 percent. Spain and her Viceroyalties of Naples and Sicily contributed 49 galleys, about 24 percent. Gian Andrea Doria had 11 galleys in his own squadron, 5 percent, while Genoa, Savoy, and the lesser Italian naval entrepreneurs accounted for another 23, another 12 percent. The Papal contingent put 12 galleys on line and the Knights of St. John of Malta 3-7 percent between them. In total, the fleet was composed by 206 galleys, 6 galleasses and more than 100 different vessels like galliots, galleons and brigs. The actual galleys were mainly oar devices, while having also sails to employ in high sea cruising; galliots, galleons and brigs were sailing merchant ships, reinforced with few men and lot of guns. The new venetian Galleasses were powerful oar-ships which could actually fire also broadsides (while galleys fired with bow guns only). The Turkish fleet was organized almost entirely by galleys.



Martyrs of Famagusta

On August 1571, the venetian fortress of Famagusta in Candia (Cyprus) surrendered. The Venetian commander,

Marco Antonio Bragadin, was tortured to death and all his officers were slaughtered. The massacre

called for vengeance at the cry: "Remember Bragadin!". The Turks spent the following weeks by pillaging the coasts of Greece, and then gathered themselves in the gulf of Corinth. The Europeans remained, along a brief period, at Corfù, but, when the knowledge of the Famagusta fate arrived, they set sails at sea, in search of the Turks. With the new of the enemies' start, the Turkish commander, Ali Pasha, departed directing himself toward the gulf of Patras. On October 7, 1571, at dawn, the two Navies came in reciprocal sight.

Don Juan gave the command of the venetian fleet to admiral Agostin Barbarigo, sending him to the left wing, leaving the opposite wing to the renowned Genoese admiral Giovanni Andrea Doria, leading a group of allied squadrons. Besides, Don Juan left a reserve team led by the marquis of Santa Cruz and putting four of his well armed galleasses in vanguard, in order to take advantage of their superior firepower against the Turks. Ali Pasha did almost the same things. His right wing was left to admiral Mehmet Shoraq (known at Venice as "Scirocco") with the orders to sail in shallow waters, trying to encircle the Barbarigo wing. The left wing, under admiral Uluç Ali, formed by the Algerian vessels, went ahead against Andrea Doria.

2. THE APPROACH

October 7, 1571, a Sunday; on all the Christian ships Holy Masses were celebrated with particular solemnity. Every officer and soldier (sailor) received a "complete indulgence for guilt and no punishment for crimes", the sky was fair, the sea, calm, but an unfavorable wind imposed the use of oars. At 8.00 o' clock, the sighting vanguard ship of Don Juan de Cardona launched the alarm: in few minutes the Turks slowly emerged against the horizon line and hundreds of sailing galleys were seen advancing in a semicircle, completely blocking the way to the gulf of Patras. Don Juan of Austria crossed his lines with a small quick vessel in order to encourage his men. When he reached the ship of the old admiral of Venice, the sage Antonio Bragadin, he cried offboard, fearing the large number of Turk ships: "Do we fight now, Sir?". The old sea-warrior answered: "Can we avoid it?". So begun the battle of Lepanto. The distance between the two fleets was esteemed on around three hours of light oar-navigation. But the Turks were rapid, downwind with full sails. Suddenly the hostile fleet came closer and, at this time, the wind suddenly reversed its direction (Spanish witnesses) and the triangular Muslim sails got flabby.

3. THE ORDER OF BATTLE

Colonel John F. Guilmartin tells:

“Don Juan ordered his fleet in the traditional four divisions: a center—the ‘main battle’—plus left and right wings and a reserve. Contemporary Spanish usage was Batalla for the center, a term plainly derived from ‘main battle,’ the traditional medieval term. Cuerno Izquierda and Cuerno Derecha were used for the left and right wings, cuerno meaning both ‘wing,’ in a military context, and ‘horn.’ The reserve squadron was called the Socorro, or ‘relief.’”

The organization into four squadrons, observed by both sides, was dictated by the inherent limitations of galleys and galley fleets. The symmetrical nature of the Muslim and Christian dispositions as stated in raw numbers are evidence of this.

Each of the Christian wings on the day of battle had 53 galleys; this represented the maximum number of galleys which could maneuver in a line abreast without losing formation integrity.

*The Muslim right wing had 54 galleys, probably for the same reason. The Muslim left had no less than 87 galleys, but there is reason to believe that they were intended to turn the Christian flank individually, with no pretense at formation keeping. For the composition of the Muslim fleet, I have followed the estimate given by Rosell Cayetano, *Historia del Combate Naval de Lepanto* (Madrid, 1853), P. 99, cited in Olesa Muñido, Vol. I, p. 371. Lesure, p. 115, arrives at the same totals by a different route.*

The Christian center, with less need to maneuver than the wings, numbered 62 galleys, an arrangement mirrored by the Muslim center which had 61 galleys on line. Don Juan’s reserve squadron had 38 galleys—apparently those left over after putting the largest number of galleys on line which was tactically feasible.

Both Don Juan and Müezzinzade Ali Pasha based their tactical plans on a center of some 61 or 62 galleys flanked by covering squadrons of marginally smaller size.

But where Don Juan concentrated his remaining galleys in a reserve squadron behind the main battle line as a defensive ‘stopper,’ Müezzinzade Ali Pasha gave the bulk of the remaining Muslim galleys to his left wing commander, Uluch Ali, a master of maneuver, with the evident hope of using their superior numbers and maneuverability to turn the Christian flank.

One of Don Juan’s earliest and most successful decisions was to break up the national contingents, distributing them between the various squadrons

to prevent a national commander from leading his forces in mass defection at a critical point. His assignment of subordinate command reflected this philosophy: Don Juan in his Real commanded the center personally, flanked in his post of honor at the exact center of the line by Sebastian Venier in the Capitano de Mar of Venice to the left and Marcantonio Colonna, the Papal commander, to the right in the Capitana of the Pope. A Venetian, Agostin Barbarigo, commanded the left wing and Gian Andrea Doria commanded the right. A Spaniard, Don Alvaro de Bazan, commanded the reserve.

But the apparent simplicity of this scheme vanishes when we consider the actual distribution of galleys, squadron by squadron. If Don Juan was primarily concerned with

the possibility of the mass withdrawal of a national contingent, what are we to make of the fact that no less than 77 percent of the left wing’s galleys were Venetian—under a Venetian commander!”

4. FIRST MOVES

The two fleets were now ready to engage when, unexpectedly, the left wing of the Christian formation, under Gianandrea Doria, widened sailing and giving the impression of an run off from the Turks.



Count Andrea Provana

The maneuver operated by the Genoese was strange and probably it would have lift doubts and suspicions. Other two formations continued to advance against the enemy preceded by the six Galleasses that, left the towing, now moved with extreme slowness.

An isolated gun shot coming from the Sultana (the leading Muslim ship) began the battle. Ali Pasha had launched the confront, and the first ones to be reached by the Turks were the Galleasses. Ali, however, ignoring the real function of that afloat monsters, commanded to ignore them and to continue directly against the hostile squadrons.

But when the Galleasses came inside the center of the hostile formation, they seemed to explode as a gunpowder depot. A hell of fire ran over by more than two hundred guns of different caliber, which had simultaneously opened the fire. The effect there was appalling.

About ten ship were injured, some sank or were seriously damaged, however the mass of the Turkish fleet, although disorganized, continued its run.

Upon the effects produced by this “Venetian secret weapon”, the judgments of the historians will result a bit conflicting. Venetians, of course, attributed to their galleasses a decisive about the battle final result.

Spanish historians, instead, thought that galleasses, except giving a little advantage during the initial phase, “were often seen alone in the middle of the sea, as sea turtles...” Actually, as observed by Romano Canosa, the galleasses had indeed a decisive role during the beginning of the fight, but later, when a mass of galleys hanged together, they could not make use of their all-around guns anymore, fearing the consequences of the friendly fire.

After an intense artillery fire a lot of ships clanged together with chains and hooks, while Turkish archers launched swarms of arrows.

Actually it was common that, during naval battles, the flagships assumed a more sheltered position, for a better driving of the operations. This didn't happen at Lepanto.

Sultana and Real, almost at the same time, launched themselves one against the other, imposing the maximum speed to oarsmen: the ramming speed! The two flagships met together by the bows and the strike was terrible. The metallic edge of the Sultana penetrated deeply into the amputated bow of the Real, while hooked ropes grasped the two galleys in an inextricable knot.

The Turks were the first to try the boarding, but they were bridled by the ropes and therefore rejected by the volleys of the four hundred “Arquebusiers” of the Tercio de Cerdeña (Sardinia).

“The Galleasses have been represented in the western naval tradition as an awkward hybrid, a sailing warship with oars. In fact, it was exactly

what its name—galeaza in Spanish, galee grosse in Venice —implies, a large galley. Needing a larger galley, which could open broadside fire was an hard challenge. The solution was found by Francesco Bressan, famous Chief of the Carpentry Department of the Venice's Arsenal, between years 1530 to 1570. He enlarged the Galea Grossa dimensions, installing new devices that allow to increase its firepower in every direction. The hull was larger than that of a “large galley” (approx. 57 meters long from the tip of the spur to the aft castle – 9 meters of hull width and approximately 12 m between the lateral oblique bulwarks) and was equipped with 23 benches per side, with “a scaloccio” oars about 18 meters long, each operated by 5 rowers. The boat was equipped with three large masts with latin sail.

When hostilities broke out, the Arsenal took advantage of their large and stable hulls, coming from merchant ship hulls, to fit them out with a heavy artillery armament (while Venice had an adequate supply of good cannon, the Spanish, by contrast, seem to have been short of artillery). Each galeass probably carried four or five full cannons, equivalent to an ordinary galley's main centerline bow gun, plus enough lesser cannon to have provided the secondary and tertiary armament for five galleys. The “large galleys” performed better under sail than ordinary galleys; this was of little tactical significance. They were considerably harder to row, which was. While considerably slower under oars—they taxed their “Ciurma” badly—they could, if competently handled, maneuver effectively in support of a fleet of galleys. They were competently handled at Lepanto”.



Don Juan of Austria

5. THE BATTLE ON THE LEFT WING

Agostin Barbarigo, commander of the left wing, hit the division of Mohammed Shoraq, a slight superior force of galleys, galliots and fast boats.

After a sequence of misleading maneuvers, the Turkish admiral, who had experienced captains, pushed his ships towards the coast, with the evident purpose to encircle the enemies and to surprise them, unaware, sailing in shallows.

Realized the danger, Marcantonio Querini, operating in the extreme left, drove towards the coast in order to parry the enemy maneuver, even risking to end the run aground in some shoal. But, despite the obstruction fire of the Venetians, Shoraq succeeded in effecting the tricky maneuver passing over, with the lightest woods, between the coast and the line of Querini.

The venetian squadron was now caught between two fire arcs and the Turks took a decisive advantage for that insertion in the rear of the enemy line. The battle line brake off and “wooden island”, formed by galleys entangled together, begun to show combats similar to those made on the solid ground.

The smoke provoked by artilleries covered entirely the battle area, and Barbarigo was attacked by four hostile ships, while other six or seven Venetian galleys had been sunk or surrounded and boarded, in the meantime. On the Barbarigo galley the clash was long and tough. Twice the janissaries, with red painted faces (in order to hide the blood of wounds), assaulted him and twice they were rejected. At the third assault, Agostin Barbarigo, giving commands, was hit by a metallic arrow, which hammered him in the right eye. The venetian admiral fell on the bridge, then transported in his stern lodging, Barbarigo, with his own hands, got the iron out from his forehead, but the wound was too heavy and he had no hope to recover.

Amidst the raging of the battle other Venetian galleys approached the confused clash. Andrea (Andrew) Barbarigo, nephew of the fallen admiral, provisionally got the group’s command, but shortly after he was killed too (replaced in turn by Federigo Nani). Now the situation seemed to be really desperate for Venetians; Janissaries were progressively advancing on the bridges, dramatically held back by exhausted defenders. Suddenly the venetian galleys of the right, since then totally inactive, fell behind Mohammed Shoraq middle gap, opening a third front, with the help of Bragadin’s brother galleass, which had approached the center of the battle with a full rowing frenzy. However, what seemed really change the

course of the fight was an unpredictable event. Taking advantage of the confusion the Christian slaves of the Shoraq’s galley got themselves free and immediately jump inside the fight, rotating the broken chains, grasping the weapons of the wounded, cutting throats of and killing their ancient masters with ruthless fury. At this moment, the Turks were forced to pass on the defensive and the struggle was transferred on their galleys.

Mohammed Shoraq, more times wounded accidentally fell in water, where he would certainly be drowned if some venetians, recognizing him from the sumptuous suits, had not saved him. Subsequently the Muslim’s admiral was conducted to Marcantonio Querini, who cheered a lot for the prestigious capture. However - as it will tell a compassionate reporter, “seeing the severe conditions of the prisoner, he ordered a merciful hit for the Turkish chief and Shoraq was quickly beheaded”.



Ali Pasha

His head was then raised on a pole and the Turks, under that gloomy vision, lost their spirit, looking to escape and throwing themselves in the water, or even running away along the «bridge» formed by the grasped galleys... and someone, was said, could hit also the beach. But not so many, nevertheless, succeeded in escaping. The thirst of revenge of Venetians was great and the recent memory of Famagusta massacre was still alive. The fugitives were finished with swords and Arquebuses’ shots.

5.1. AT THE CENTER

Also the center formed another great “wooden island” submerged in a deep cloud of smoke. Around the flagships of Don Juan and Ali Pasha, about thirty galleys were bridled in an inextricable tangle of bows, nets and ropes.

The papal galley of prince Marcantonio Colonna had boarded the galley of Pertev Pasha, an european soldier of fortune who led turkish militias. In the meanwhile, the venetian Capitan de Mar, Sebastian Venier, who had approached the Real to bring his help, went into the struggle. The battle was reaching its climax.

On the left of the Christian front the team of Barbarigo was still locked in a fierce struggle with the galleys of Shoraq, while Gianandrea Doria, on the right wing, was trying to disengage himself from a strong pressure.

But it was in the center, and particularly around the two opposed flagships, that developed the decisive clash. After the Sardinians arquebusiers had rejected two attacks of the Janissaries (they had come up onto the bow yard where the League standard was personally hoisted by Don Juan, who was also slightly wounded in the leg), Christians went to counterattack. The first to jump on the Sultana were the arquebusiers of the Sardinia’s Tercio, followed by those of Castile.

The fight on the Sultana was not decisive, having the Jannissaries got some reinforcements from other ships. Ali Pasha, surrounded by his soldiers, stood near the main mast, fighting as a lion and hitting the enemy with his arrows. Taking advantage of the critical moment, other Christian galleys approached the Sultana, raking it and so interrupting the arrival of the reinforcement, sent through the stern passage.

Contemporarily, other 200 arquebusiers of Sicily’s Tercio united themselves to the Don Juan’s men. The Sultana, now attacked from many parts and surrounded by ships and wrecks, which prevented the access of rescuers, was obviously condemned, even if the Turks, without ammunitions and without arrows, withstood fiercely.

Desperately, Ali Pasha bravely threw himself against the advancing Don Juan staff, but there was not any chivalrous movie-ending between the two admirals; a hit of arquebus finished the Turk chief. Without wasting time, a “**buonavoglia**” sailor cut off his head, raising the trophy on an pike, and throw all in front of Don Juan. The death of their Kapudan demoralized the survivors, who hastened to abandon the ship. Few minutes later, the Allah standard was wrapped up on the Sultana

and replaced by the St.Andrew’s image, symbol of the Tercio.

6. THE RIGHT WING

When the St.Andrew flag was raised on the Sultana and Don Juan, as the Venetians, claimed for victory, Gianandrea Doria, in the right, was aloft in the sea locked in his “manoeuvres enigmatiques”, as said Jurien de la Gravière.

The behaviour of Gianandrea Doria at Lepanto has never been entirely clarified. For the Genoese historians “he was who made great damages to the Turks”, for the Venetians, instead, the Genoese “still obeyed to the Phillip II instructions”. It is however a fact that if Doria acted in suspicious way, this was due to the intensive pursue of the pirate chief Uluç Ali (Uluç Ali Reis, later Uluç Ali Paşa and finally Kılıç Ali Paşa; born Giovanni Dionigi Galeni) an Italian (Calabrian) Captain, in the Ottoman service. Uluç Ali, pronounced Uluchali remembered the venetian word for glasses (uciali - occhiali in Italian); this was his nickname at Venice.

Someone even insinuated that the two captains, both crafty calculators and jealous of their own ships, would have chosen to have self-respect by avoiding to damage their precious galleys.



Gianandrea Doria

“Characteristically, then, Genoa’s main naval contribution to the Holy Alliance was in the form of 11 galleys under Gian Andrea Doria, serving under a thoroughly commercial and highly remunerative personal contract to the Spanish Crown. Not only were Doria and his fellow condottieri, well paid

for their trouble on a galley per month basis (each of Doria's galleys cost Spain a third more than an equivalent Spanish vessel), they were pulling down a 14 percent annual rate of interest on the money which Philip II had borrowed from them to purchase their services!

Is it entirely unreasonable to assume, as the Venetians did, that Doria had little interest in coming to hand strokes with the Ottoman forces?" Instead to close on the fleet of Ali Pasha, Gianandrea Doria had widened to the right of the Christian line, therefore Uluç Ali got ahead to the pursuit. Exploiting the, now, favourable wind, the Genoese ships, whose last galleys would have had to proceed around forty paces, from the first galley of the Center division, were quickly pushed away over four miles, so opening a vast space in which Uluç Ali, would have been able easily to insert him and to attack the unaware central Christian formation.

While the Right Wing sailed away from the principal point of the clash, its rearguard, composed by sixteen galleys (not Genoese, twelve were venetian, two spaniards, one from Savoy and one from Malta), under its commander initiative, drove bows against the right side of the arriving Uluç Ali squadron. Evidently the commander, fearing that the Doria was about to a real releasing, he had autonomously decided to bring his ships to cover the left space open from the Genoese.

"It was a near thing, for as the centers locked up in mortal combat, the offshore squadrons entered into a deadly contest, a contest which Uluç Ali won. Just what happened and how is unclear; it is plain, however, that Uluç Ali Pasha and Gian Andrea Doria engaged in extended maneuvering, with the

net result that the Christian right became badly separated from the center. In Doria's defense, there is no evidence that his offshore flank was turned. There is, however, evidence that his squadron had become fragmented and that the battle on the offshore flank had lost cohesion.

For reasons at which we can only guess, numbers of Christian galleys broke formation and headed for the main fight in the center. They may have been led by captains who perceived that Doria was treasonously holding them out of combat and that Doria had been completely outmaneuvered to the point that it was too late for the niceties of formation tactics and moved, accepting the disadvantages of a melee with the Muslims to do something, anything, before it was too late.

In either case, Uluç Ali, observing the widening gap between the bulk of the Christian right and center turned inward and shot the gap between them, slamming into the exhausted right flank of the Christian center with deadly effect.

For a brief period the issue was in doubt: the Capitana of the Knights of St. John of Malta was overrun and several galleys were captured. Disaster was averted by the timely arrival of the reserve under Don Alvaro de Bazan. Observing the collapse of the Muslim center before his eyes and seeing the telltale traces in the distance of the fiasco on the inshore flank, Uluç Ali gathered his remaining forces, evacuated his prize crews from the overrun Christian galleys, and ran for it down the gulf. He got away with perhaps 30 galleys, the largest intact Muslim force to escape from the battle.

And so the battle of Lepanto was over; at 4 o'clock of the October 7, 1571."



7. CONCLUSION

The success had been dearly bought. On both sides the losses in the hard-fought battle had been terrible. The allies had about 7500 men killed or drowned, two-thirds of these fighting-men, the rest rowers. The nobles and knights had exposed themselves freely in the mêlée, and Spain, Malta, Venice, and the Italian cities had each and all their roll of heroic dead. The list of the Venetians begins with the names of seventeen captains of ships, including the admiral Barbarigo, besides twelve other chiefs of great houses who fought under the standard of St. Mark in command of companies of fighting-men. No less than sixty of the Knights of St. John “gave their lives that day for the cause of Christ,” to quote the annalist of the Order. Several others were wounded, and of these the Prior Giustiniani and his captain, Naro, of Syracuse, died soon after. One of the knights killed in the battle was a French, Raymond de Loubière, a Provençal. Another Frenchman, the veteran De Romegas, fought beside Don Juan on the “Real” and to his counsel and aid the commander-in-chief attributed much of his success in the campaign. The long lists of the Spanish, Neapolitan, Roman, and Genoese nobles who fell at Lepanto include many historic names.

The losses of the defeated Moslems were still heavier. The lowest estimate makes the number of the dead 20,000, the highest 30,000. Ali Pasha and most of his captains were killed. Ali’s two sons and several of his best officers were among the prisoners. Fifteen Turkish galleys were sunk or burned, no less than 190 ships were the prizes of the victors.

A few galleys had escaped by the Little Dardanelles to Lepanto. A dozen more had found refuge with Ulugh Ali in the fortified harbour of Santa Maura. The Algerine eventually reached Constantinople, and laid at the feet of Sultan Selim the standard of the Knights of Malta, which he had secured when he was in temporary possession of Giustiniani’s flagship.

Some sources disagree on the losses number: Oliver Warner affirms that the strengths of the Holy League had around 8000 dead and 16.000 wounded, and that the Turks probably lost around 25.000 men, while 15.000 slaves were freed from oars. J.F.C. Fuller brings a total of 15.000 losses for the League and, for the Turks, 30.000 dead in battle, an unknown number of drowned and 8000 prisoners.

Concerning ships, the Europeans lost 13 galleys (12 sunk and 1 captured), while the Turks had

113 galleys sunk and 117 captured. The defeat of Lepanto meant for the Moslems the end of the power and the maritime ambitions.

Days of Lepanto were also the last days of the galleys. The sailing ships, which timidly appeared in this battle, represented the future: in comparison to the galleys, they were faster on long distances and they could bring a greater number of guns. Lepanto also constituted the last important occasion in which a naval battle was performed by foot soldiers, fighting aboard of the ships, like on the common ground. 15 years later, in fact, the clash among the English Royal Navy and the Spanish Armada will present guns and sails instead of swords and oars... and this was also the beginning of Venice’s sea power ending.



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

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