This file was most recently updated on 12/14/08. That material is toward the end of the file in blue.

This file was updated again on 23 January 2009. Some duplicated material was deleted at the start of the Q&A section (noted in bold/green) and another Q&A exchange was added at the end of the file in bold/green.

War in the Pacific 2ⁿᵈ Edition Frequently Asked Questions File

In a message dated 9/19/2006 3:32:43 PM Pacific Daylight Time, david.bush@insightbb.com writes:

Thanks again for offering to help with rules questions. My friend and I are getting ready to tackle the first couple intro scenario's and I wanted to get your clarification on a couple of items.

Midway Scenario

63.4 Has the 6xSBD and 2xD3A1's at "High" altitude. Yet when I read rule 7.1B it states that "D" type AP's must use an approach mode equal to their rating. At which altitude would these AP's carry out Air-to-Air combat? High, or their rated altitude of Medium?

ANS:
The referenced rule is correct; the scenario instructions are wrong. Change the SBD's & D3A's altitudes to "medium." (official errata on this submitted to DG).

5.1.2 Multiple Bombardment: Does this rule only apply to multiple attacks by AP's versus a ground target, base?

ANS:
No. The rule also applies to (Air-Naval) special strikes vs. at-sea enemy TF's, unless such a strike is launched during a Naval Phase immediately-following a strike flown during the immediately-preceding Air Phase -- regardless of the target of that Air-Phase-launched strike.

In a message dated 9/20/2006 5:26:41 PM Pacific Daylight Time, GarrettO writes:

Maybe I have missed it, but I cannot find any clarifications of Remove/Convert. Suppose the ship referred to has been sunk. Is the Removal/conversion just ignored, or is an identical ship substituted, or a more powerful ship if there is no match.

ANS:
"Remove," as defined herein, means "remove from play (permanently, unless the Rein Schedule indicates that the unit returns)." Conversions are not applicable to sunk ships.

The British battleship Anson, BB 79, has been omitted. It arrived in the Pacific in company with BB 17, Duke of York, which has an arrival date of 6/45. If the war goes past 8/45, both ships could see service.

ANS:
Well, that was a pretty astute catch. But, the reason D/Y is in the game, and Anson isn't, is that D/Y actually sortied (as part of TF 37's carrier raids on Japan), whereas Anson didn't. That said, Anson is included in the "War Expansion Kit," although on checking the Rein Schedule I have her erroneously arriving in 0/1/46. I've made a note to change that. I'll have to research it exactly myself, but I'll probably delay her arrival until 0/9/45 or so.

In the initial setup USN CA35 and CA36 are sitting near Pearl Harbor without any escort, making them vulnerable to sub attack from the Japanese SS nearby. In reality they were escorted by 4 or 5 DMS each (destroyer minesweepers, converted sisterships to the old DDs 1-18 that do appear, or the APDs they convert into). These ships retained their sonar and depth charges, therefore are capable of screening.

ANS:
No, no AM's or DMS's in this countermix. The culprit here, I'm guessing, is the semi-colon following the initial referenced deployment hex. They should be commas (as per the carrier TF's preceding them) -- indicating the wide latitude in deployment options available. Moreover, the US player has up to 4 "dummy" TF's to deploy. Aside from that (I'm afraid), these two will have to take their chances.

In a message dated 9/22/2006 2:11:20 PM Pacific Daylight Time, Dhh gamer writes:

Great game. Looks like a real winner to me. A friend and I will start playing the scenarios tomorrow. I have a couple of questions:

Do admirals roll ratings once per sorte or every time they are engaged in a battle (launch planes or surface)?

ANS:
Admirals roll for ratings (when required) only once per sortie. Once an admiral's combat ratings have been determined during a sortie, he retains those ratings until his next sortie (i.e., following deactivation of his TF, in port). The only possible exception to this is that for a subordinate admiral who (for whatever reason) becomes a TF commander. In such cases, his ratings would, in a subsequent combat, be re-rolled.

I take it generals roll both to see if they are in command and the leadership value any time any leadership value could have any effect?

ANS:
Yes, but the DR determining which (local, or "on-site;" or HQ commander) general may affect the pending ground unit(s) -- in the case of movement -- or combat. If a general is determined to be "present" [26.1.2], then his ratings may apply to the ensuing ground operation (movement and/or combat). If variable (1D6) ratings apply, this requires a subsequent 1D6 DR.

Can two ships representing multiples be combined? Two DD with D2 to make one undammaged DD? Two MSU with D2 to make one undammaged MSU?

ANS:
MSU's & APA's/APB's: Yes. DD's/APD's/DE's/DET's: No. Transports may combine & breakdown freely. For example:

1x MSU (full; Load capacity "7") can break down into:
  1. 7x "D3" MSU's or
  2. 2x "D2" MSU's + 1x "D1" MSU or
  3. 1x "D1" MSU + 2x "D3" MSU's or
  4. 1x "D2" MSU + 4x "D3" MSU's

Recombination follows the same process -- with net load capacity determining the "recombined" unit.

What is the Air-to-Air rating for AP that can only do a type R mission for? I don't see that they ever engage in air combat?

ANS:
Only in one instance: In case the "R" AP is intercepted by enemy CAP placed over its airbase -- either rebasing in or out. It won't happen often, but it is possible. Note: Most of these "rebase" missions will be

flown at night, so (unless the owning player is careless), generally, such combat will be limited to night fighters assigned these type CAP missions.

The Java Sea scenario has ships that don't exist involved?

ANS:

We re-numbered all the DD counters once the ship counters were redesigned, and that scenario was constructed prior to the "reorganization."

In a message dated 9/25/2006 11:58:19 AM Pacific Daylight Time, Dhh gamer writes:

I forgot to ask - can in air-to-air the aborted and kill result be combined to abort? For example could a 4/2 result abort a strength 6 AP? If not was it intended that a single AP might never be able to even abort an AP of equal strength? We were wondering what point there is in an escort of just one AP.

ANS:
No, the results cannot be combined. The air-to-air CRT was designed so that a single AP would (generally speaking) always have at least a small chance of aborting one enemy CAP fighter (unless the enemy fighter has an air combat rating of "6"). For example, there is a 16% chance of aborting an enemy fighter of "4" strength, and a 3% chance of aborting a "5" rated fighter.

Moreover, you don't know in advance if the opposing CAP will be fully-trained or not. If not, then the chances of scoring at least one "abort" dramatically increase.

So, generally speaking, assigning only one fighter as escort will only rarely have an impact. You have to tailor these tactics to your opposition, taking everything into account, as to whether or not it would be worthwhile.

In a message dated 9/29/2006 12:23:57 PM Pacific Daylight Time, rockdoc53@earthlink.net writes:

I hope all is well. we have aquick question re: campaign game reinforcements .I f there is no designated location on the Campaign game reinforcement table, where do they arrive if Naval or ground of the various nationalities ?
Thanks in advance,

ANS:

[53.9] governs Japanese new unit deployment arrivals not specifically designated. Specifically:
    [53.9.1] Ships
    [53.9.2] Air Points
    [53.9.3] Ground Units

[52.6] governs Allied new unit deployment arrivals. Specifically:
    [52.6.1] All U.S. units
    [52.6.4] CW ships
    [52.6.5] CW Air Points

(I believe all CW ground unit reinforcements have their arrival sites specifically designated. If you find any that aren't, please let me know).

In a message dated 10/2/2006 7:07:50 AM Pacific Daylight Time, Smith.P@Interfleet.co.uk writes:

well done and congratualtions - your efforts in re-working this monster are much appreciated. At first glance the game seems a much better balance than its predecessor and the inclusion of tactical maps was truly inspirational. Now having lulled you into a false sense of security, I need your help/views on the following:

1.   I'm struggelling with the impact on on-board carrier air points when the home carrier is damaged. I read the rules as stating that the % reduction in operational capbility does not equate to air points lost. If so, is there a separate rule to decide the air point losses or should there be none? If there is no rule to define air point losses in such circumstances (assuming the air points are not away on a mission), I'm thinking of using the 'Bombardment of Air Points' table (11.3) with the X+ columns for the relevant level of damage (1 throw for all air points present with type decided by random) - what do you think?

ANS:
Thanks for the undeserved kind words above. First, re carrier air points & their loss via damage done to their carrier. When a carrier is damaged, loss (actually, "inoperable" status, not outright loss) to embarked, non-aloft AP's is determined only if the carrier suffers at least "D3" damage (see "Naval Damage Levels: Effects" table [16.8]). If this occurs, then 11.3.1 applies. Note: You'll notice that the expected results will produce high percentages of "inoperable" AP's. This is deliberate, and reflects not only the probable damage to hangar-deck/etc. aircraft, but the inability to operate aircraft at these very high (D3/D4) damage levels.

Now, re aloft air points (CAP, airstrike), their loss (again, "inoperable" status) is determined if they are forced to return to any damaged carrier (D1-D4), as per 11.5.11.

2.   Now as for CAP and missions. I read the rules as stating that fighters that have performed a strike mission are unavailable to perform emergency CAP. Am I reading this right? Seems to me that if air points can fly additional special strikes they should be able to perform additional CAP over their own base, say with a two column shift on the air point availability table?

ANS:
Fighters which have flown strike missions (either as a FB or as a FTR escort) before an enemy airstrike arrives in their home TF's hex, or are flying such strikes simultaneously with (via the "Strike Sequence Table"), are not eligible to then fly Emergency Cover CAP missions during that phase. The determining factor is which strike (your fighters wishing to fly Emergency Cover CAP or the enemy airstrike) arrives (read: is resolved) first.

Conversely, if your fighters are plotted to perform a strike of their own (not CAP), but have yet to launch that mission (for whatever reason -- voluntarily or via the "Strike Sequence Table"), then their strike (or their participation in that strike) may be canceled. In such a case these fighters are then free to attempt Emergency Cover CAP.

3.   And finally to the AA rules. As with the original game the AA rules are biased in favour of attacks that include a single type of attack plane as compared to a same size attack with equal numbers of low/torpedo and dive bomber types. I know you get a shift to the left for such a combined attack, but the chance of two shots at six air points split between low and dive bomber levels, still looks more effective AA fire than the same fire power against a single level attack

    E.g a typical mixed wave of 3 VBs plus 3 VTs could all be returned/destroyed by AA fire on the 36-45 column. Or 4 VBs and 2 VTs reduced to single VB, whereas 6 VBs by comparison get a guaranteed two air points through.

ANS:
Yes, but the % chances (in the above example) of turning (or killing) the entire strike back is:
27% x 27% = 7%.

Re "guaranteed" AP's through," it was just this sort of situation that we wanted to avoid; namely the aspect of certain (or near-certain, depending on your foreknowledge of the enemy's ships) "guaranteed" results. We thus decided to retain the (basics of, at least) the original game's TF AA mechanics. Mainly, to reduce

the # of "guaranteed" results, as, historically, nothing is "guaranteed."

I guess you must have extensively playtested this mechanism so I would welcome any comments/justification you could provide in support of the current rules.

ANS:Yes, we did some pretty extensive play-testing. And, generally-speaking, the system works nearly exactly as we aimed for. I say "nearly exactly" because, through the campaign game play-test, TF AA was always very slightly too powerful. In other words, not quite enough aircraft were "getting through," at least every time. I'd say that the system was approx. 5% too effective in turning back air points.

Now, there are some column shifts and DRM's in the "Anti-Aircraft Table" that were not present during the last full-game play-test. Namely:

1. The last-listed "1L" 1st-wave-dictated column shift   and
2. The next-to-last (1st wave) DRM

I subsequently did extensive play-testing, including the above two, with the Pearl Harbor strike and the strike against "Force Z." The results were entirely satisfactory, and I'm quite confident that (again, generally speaking) the AA Table will produce game results well in line with the design intent.

In a message dated 10/9/2006 1:17:28 AM Pacific Daylight Time, Smith.P@Interfleet.co.uk writes:

Hi Kevin, hope you really appreciate these questions because I have some more.......

On the search question - I accept you comments on the IJN use of search planes, but that gives me another problem with the carrier searches. Have I got these values rigt for Coral Sea?

ANS:
No, not quite. See below

2 USN carriers each with 4 SBDs total 8, each one with a search range of 2 at medium range. Total 16 - approx successful search at Medium range 60%ish plus (ie 60 -100) can't recall the exact number on the chart.
The search values you calculated for TF 17 are correct, but the % chance of success at medium range is not. At medium range (the "assumed" range we'll use herein because that was the historic range), the % chance of success is actually 40%, not 60-ish.

If the IJN carriers approach during a night phase, unseen, the enext air phase begins with both sides carrying out carrier based searches.

ANS:
The IJN value is 2 carriers at 2 points each and 2 CAs at 2 points each. total 8 points giving a percentage chance of around 20%. ie 80-100% for success. Why are the US so much better when you claim similar numbers of search planes, Kates and SBDs have similar ranges, especially if the SBDs are armed.

The search value for the IJN's Carrier Strike Force, at medium range, is "17:"

2x CV's = 4
1x CVL = 1
4x E13A1 CA's = 8
2x "other" CA's = 4

The % chance of a successful search, then, for this TF (as compared with Fletcher's TF 17) is 50%. Thus, from a strictly carrier TF vs. carrier TF search value perspective, the IJN's % chances of success are actually better, not worse. This is exactly as it should be, at least in the present example.

BTW, as far as the scenario itself goes, the Japanese side has a very high land-based air search value at Rabaul, a small one at Shortlands, and another potential short one if their AV is used as it was historically (i.e., parked in the Louisades).

Oh and on the subject of Admiral ratings - what did Ad Kinkaid do to warrant his high values - wasn't he the guy in charge at Santa Cruz?

ANS:
Well, the problem here is what do you mean by "high values." First, if you examine the 1941-2 carrier-rated admirals, for both the USN & IJN, you'll find that Kinkaid is solidly in the middle of the pack. As such, his ratings would more properly be termed "average" than "high." That said, if you mean what did he do to warrant his "average" values, then the answer would be:

Unlike most USN carrier TF commanders in 1942, Kinkaid had extensive combat experience handling flattops, and his overall performance could (admittedly this is somewhat subjective), in my opinion, in no way be termed below par. A brief summary of his actions in 1942:

8/42: Subordinate to Adm. Fletcher (TF 61 commander). Participated in E. Solomons battle. Two combat sorties.

10/42: TF 16 commander, Santa Cruz battle. Though the US suffered a tactical (operative word here is "tactical") defeat, Kinkaid showed excellent aggressiveness in his pre-battle movements. Had he received the blame for the loss of the Hornet, he likely would've been fired, either by Halsey or Nimitz. Instead, he again commanded TF 16 in November:

11/42: TF 16 commander, Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Took no part in ops of 12 Nov, but on 14 Nov. launched limited airstrikes on IJN transports, then inflicted heavy damage on IJN CA, sinking it.

Thus, in my opinion (as objectively as possible), Kinkaid's ratings seem to be pretty much what they should be. In fact, I'm rather surprised that your argument was "why his ratings weren't better?" Of course, it would be hard to justify that, considering the loss of Hornet. In sum, then, I think Kinkaid's ratings are exactly where they should be.

My general point related rather more to the effect of the US carriers being worth 3 points on the 1st CC check rather than the values of the Admirals them selves, it seems to give the US a chance of failing the first check when the IJN alomst certainly can't. (Use of 6 column as opposed to 4). Had I been on the development/palytest team I suspect I'd have been strongly against the inclusion of some of the combat rating benefits - I don't see how the skill of an Admiral should produce column shits or DRMs on the combat charts - maybe some training policies perhaps - but it makes the game feel like topo much of a lottery. Yes I know some of these battles were heavily influenced by luck or one off decisions but it just doesn't feel right to me - the luck belongs in the combat tables!

ANS:
Here, I disagree completely. If I had adopted that philosophy, there would've been no reason at all to include admirals. Or, for that matter, generals. I feel the opposite; making all the luck emanate solely from the combat tables would actually make the game feel like a lottery.

Having said that, I like their impact on the surface battles.

ANS:
Well, if it works for surface battles, then you can hardly justify (effectively) taking carrier admirals out of the mix -- or arbitrarily reducing their respective effects. If successful surface admirals have the ability to directly affect combat, the historically-successful carrier admirals simply must have the same ability. I'm not sure I see the logic in liking the effects for surface battles, but not for carrier battles.

Do you think it would unbalance the game in any way to limit the use of Commanders to HQ, surface naval, and air strike co-ordination/reaction - basically ignoring the tactical impacts on air/surface attacks (column shifts and DRMs on the damage/hit charts?).

ANS:
I'm not sure it would "unbalance the game," but I do not in any way share your opinion that the carrier admirals' ratings are out of place. Consider it this way: You could make the same argument re the surface admirals. Namely, "it was the gun crew director that deserved the credit for that hit scored, not the admiral." Conversely, vis-a-vis carrier actions, "it was the pilot who deserved the credit for that hit, not the admiral." Actually, in both instances, it was (at least partially, but in reality most probably significantly) the training and combat maneuvering as directed by the TF commander that influenced the action.

In a message dated 10/12/2006 2:43:30 PM Pacific Daylight Time, johnrtummey@hotmail.com writes:

Hi Kevin,

Thanks for the errata, though I have another question because of it.

Do CW ships have unique DD numbers regardless of nation ?

ANS:
Yes, they do.

The reason I ask is because of 65.5, page 4 middle of the page, is this :-

Either Colombo or Trincomalee:
Naval:
DD 2 (D2)

I have looked for a British (RN) DD2 but can not find one.

I had originally assumed it was a RAN DD 2 but your latest errata conflicts with this since it is in Force B.

ANS:
Sorry, I missed this: Delete the "DD 2 (D2)" entry for the above.

In a message dated 10/15/2006 4:06:32 PM Pacific Daylight Time, eric.kintzer@cropredy.com writes:

Thank you in advance for taking the time to answer a WITP question:

These questions are all related to that most vexing of issues - Naval Operations / speed class / active phases:

Q1: 16.0 versus 18.2.1

Section 16.0 states that "Ships (TF's) have their Speed Class initially assigned to them either:
A. At the beginning of the 1st Naval Phase in which they will sortie (during the Plot Segment) or
B. During the Plot Segment of the 1st Naval Phase following a phase in which the ships fueled."

but section 18.2.1 says that ships change their speed class only at the beginning of the First Naval Phase of a Game Turn:

"[18.2.1] Changing Speed Class: Restrictions
Ships/TF's voluntarily changing their speed class may do so only at the beginning of the First Naval Phase (during the Plot Segment) of Game/Turns"

These are contradictory. A GT has three naval phases and a TF may sortie during any of the three phases; equally, a TF may fuel during any of the three naval phases in a GT. 18.2.1 says you can change only one the first naval phase of the GT.

ANS:
Re the above, the key word here is initially. 18.2.1 does not contradict 16.0, though a clarification to the last paragraph in 16.0, summarizing later speed class changes, certainly would help. As such, a clarification errata to this effect will be published shortly.

Q2: Back to 18.2.1

Speed class 3 ships can convert to speed class 2 at a specific conversion rate that doesn't make any sense for two of the three cases:

example:
Speed class 3 ship has 3 active phases remaining: Do they get 4 1/2 phases at speed class 2? Rounded up or down?

ANS:
A speed class "3" ship has 3 active phases remaining only:
a) immediately before it sorties,   or
b) immediately after refueling at sea

As such, there is no reason to "change" from SC3 to SC2, as that TF may assign itself SC2 according to 16.0 (A, B).

Speed class 3 ship has 1 active phase remaining: Do they get 1 1/2 phases at speed class 2? Rounded up or down?

ANS:
The key is "for every 2 SC3 active phases remaining." There is no reason for rounding; if it has 3 phases remaining at SC3, see above. If it has two SC3 phases remaining, it receives exactly 3 active phases at SC2. If it has one SC3 active phase remaining, that doesn't qualify as "...for every two SC3 active phases remaining." (Hence, no conversion to SC2).

Q3: 18.4 Active Phase Duration versus 18.2.1

Per 18.2.1, if a Speed class 3 ship can convert to a speed class 1 ship at a rate of 3 active speed class 1 phases for every speed class 3 phase remaining, then a speed class 3 ship could convert to 9 speed class 1 phases. But 18.4 says that a speed class 1 ship is limited to 4 total active naval phases. Which is it? Nine (9) or four (4)?. What about when a speed class 3 ship has two remaining active phases thus meriting six (6) speed class 1 phases. One active phase has been used, six more speed class 1 phases are due. Does the ship get all six or just four or even four - one = 3?

ANS:
I see the confusion here. There will be errata published shortly, to this effect:

[18.4] Active Phase Duration Table. Add an asterisk after "4" in the Speed Class 1 row:

* "may, in rare instances, be increased to 6 via speed class reduction. See [18.2.1] (1) & (2)."

I sense rule 18.4 is there to say - if you operate at speed class 1, you can be at sea for four weeks; if you operate at speed class 3, you can be at sea for one week, and if you operate at speed class 2 you can be at sea for 2 1/2 weeks. "Being at sea" means until fueled (by an oiler or at port). That said, please clarify this

question.

ANS:
Yes, but only if you sortie, and remain at, those SC's.

In a message dated 10/22/2006 12:10:45 PM Pacific Daylight Time, Bill@thefishingcoach.com writes:

A question on the air unit counters. Some have the same color band but different colored plane bodies. What is the purpose of the colors on the plane bodies?

ANS:
In strict game terms, none. The types with different paint schemes were added for variety, and in case players wish to differentiate b/t early & late types, and carrier vs. non-carrier trained Air Points.

Example: The Japanese player might want to use the camouflaged A5M's, B5N's, & D3A's, and the green A6M's, as (land-based) non-carrier-trained (while using the grey A5M's, A6M's, D3A's, and the green B5N's, as carrier-trained.

Re the CW (RAF, RAAF) Spitfires, one plane is a Spit V; the others (green) could represent later marks (VIII, IX, XIV). Re the US P-38's, one could use the green ones for early marks; the aluminum for later. Again, obviously, in game terms this has no impact whatsoever, and mixing various paint schemes is entirely up to the player. The US P-40's with the Nationalist China insignia were designed to be used as "AVG" units.

So, in sum, it was pretty much done for variety purposes.

In a message dated 11/5/2006 2:26:01 PM Pacific Standard Time, sda44@videotron.ca writes:

Hi Kevin,

First off, thanks for a tremendous effort in the design of this game! I hope you're not tired of hearing it, but it looks great, and I believe we'll have a blast with it!

My gaming buddies and I have been playing through the scenarios to prepare ourselves for a campaign game, and have come up with a few questions.

1- Rule 13.3.2 states that a moving TF can perform a search on an enemy TF. In our example, the moving TF contains Carriers. Assuming a successful contact (and a 'Dummy' not being called…), can the moving TF's mission plot be interrupted in any way to allow for an air strike to be sent against the contacted TF FROM this moving TF? We did not see that this was possible within the rules, but we wondered about the logic of a search performed by a Carrier TF not being able to react before moving out of range of this contact when continuing it's plotted move. Any explanation to enlighten us would be greatly appreciated.

ANS:
1. **[13.3.2]** Add a new 3rd paragraph:

Note: For purposes of this rule, "successful" is defined as achieving a "located" result against an enemy TF that is not reported as a "dummy."

Successful searches from moving carrier TF's provide the searching TF(s) the options of:

a) Immediately voiding and changing their current Mission Plot destination (see 17.16.10)   and

b) Launching a Special Strike (5.8) against the "located" TF (or TF's), either immediately or within the moving TF's immediately-succeeding 18 naval MP's expended. See 5.8.9.

Add: **[17.16.10] Moving Carrier TF's**

Non-reacting carrier TF's achieving a successful air search "located" result against any enemy TF not reported as a "dummy" may, upon receipt of such a contact report, void their current remaining Mission Movement Plot (for the current Naval Phase). Such TF's may re-plot their designated destination hex, using whatever naval MP's that TF had remaining, under the previous mission plot, at the instant it achieved the "located" report. See also 5.8.9 (Special Strikes).

Note that only the designated hex destination may be voided/altered. The TF's EV, composition, and assigned mission(s) may not be changed.

For ("Alpha") reacting carrier TF's, see 17.5.7.

Add: **[5.8.9] Special Air Strikes from moving (non-reacting) carrier TF's**

Moving carrier TF's achieving a "located" result against an enemy TF that is not reported as a "dummy" may launch a special strike against that located enemy TF (or TF's, in the case of multiple "located" enemy TF's occupying the same searched hex).

Procedure. This special strike may be launched either:

a) immediately upon receiving the enabling "located" report   or

b) at any point during the expenditure of that TF's next eligible (probably re-plotted) 18 naval MP's   or

c) at the conclusion of the expenditure of a maximum of 18 naval MP's

This special strike is conducted as per 5.8 "Procedure Against Naval Units," as if the "located" enemy TF(s) had been searched as they were moving, and the launching carrier TF which located them had been stationary. Rules 5.8.3 and 12.0 ("Strike Sequencing") apply to these "moving special strikes" as well.

2- In the 'Operation Watchtower' scenario, there are no Allied supply bases listed in the set-ups. How are we to assume that Allied units draw supply? We assumed map-edge, but are uncertain.

2. In the Scenarios & Campaign Reinforcements booklet, pg. 37, 3rd column, "Noumea (E3221)," add:

Ground:
  Supply Base

3- In Air-Air Combat, a result against a single 4 strength AC is 7/4. Is there an order for determining the result – Aborts applied first followed by Kills, vice-versa, or is it the attacking player's choice?

3. See 6.3.1, 2nd paragraph, 4th sentence:
("...attacking player may distribute the results as he desires")

4- Air-Air Combat against 2 non-elite Claude AC, 1 non-elite Zero AC, and 1 Elite Zero AC, calls for one abort. How is the loss attributed with regards to Elite or not? Can the attacker choose the Elite AC over the normal AC, assuming sufficient results rolled for?

4. Yes. It depends on the exact CRT result. The "elite" Zero (assuming all AP's are operating at normal range) has an air combat value of "6." Thus, you need to achieve at least a "6" as an abort/elim. result in order to affect that AP. If the CRT result does indicate at least a "6," then it is the attacking player's choice as to how to or whether to apply it against that AP.

Example: Say you (as the Allied player) rolled a "7/3" result. You would opt to eliminate 1x of the Claudes, and could "abort:"

The "elite" Zero AP   or
The non-elite Zero AP + the remaining Claude AP

5- A hex containing an airbase is attacked by an Air Strike. This hex contains 2 Hurricane AC, and 2 more Hurricanes are flying Cover-CAP over the same hex from another airbase. Air combat results in 1 Hurricane being destroyed. How is it determined from which base the lost AC is from? Attacker or defender choice or otherwise?

5. Assuming that all of the Hurricanes possess the same air combat value, any aborts/eliminations from among the 4 present are determined randomly. If the air combat values are not the same, then the attacking player (depending on the exact results) may possibly choose the specific air combat strengths to affect -- but the AP's affected must still be determined randomly if more than one same-rated AP may be affected.

There will be official errata published (re #'s 1 & 2, above) shortly. Thanks!

In a message dated 11/8/2006 7:59:30 PM Pacific Standard Time, masstedon@sbcglobal.net writes:

Congratulations on such a finely designed game. I've had this for 6 weeks
and only now have come up with a question while playing the Guadalcanal
campaign:

When an HQ is activated, does this also activate all linked, appropriate (to the HQ) air points? I can't find anything that says one way or the other,
but I assume the answer is yes.

ANS:
Air points don't need to be "activated" for normal use (e.g., launching routine air strikes, etc.). There are, though, instances wherein CP's may be expended (or required) for certain air operations:

1. Air Transfers (flying AP's into a new or interim base). See 4.4.4.

2. "All-out efforts." See 5.1.3

3. Staging strikes (missions). See 5.14.1

Note that the HQ "controlling" the bases involved in the above instances need not be activated itself for these CP expenditures. See 4.4.4 for determining eligible "controlling" HQ's.

4. Strategic Bombing. See Activation Costs Summary; charts. The same note re HQ as above applies, except that (IIRC) the rule is a little more lenient as to where the CP's may come from.

> In a message dated 11/19/2006 6:45:12 PM Pacific Standard Time, sda44@videotron.ca writes:

1- We understand Rule 22.5.7 that states that successful sub searches do not result in contacted TF's for Air-Strike purposes (see question 1a…). Assume a successful sub search on a TF. Subsequently, an air search is conducted on the same TF, with the purpose of contacting for an air strike, and is successful. Does the TF owner need to draw a search chit,

ANS:
Yes. Search chits must always be drawn following successful air searches.

and if so, could he, upon drawing a False Report search chit, state that this TF is a dummy after it had been

'Definitively-Revealed' (13.6.3) by the previous sub contact, thereby preventing an air strike from being called (13.6.4)?

ANS:
The "definitively-revealed" process deals exclusively with dummy TF's: either real (i.e.,non-dummy) TF's reported as "dummies" or actual dummy TF's.

Moreover, the sequence is determinative. In the present example, the sub's contact, occurring before the air search, merely reveals the fact that the TF, at that point in time, is not in fact a "dummy." It has no impact on succeeding actions.

Thus, if the TF owner draws a "Report False" chit for the following air search, he may indeed declare the TF a "dummy."

Now, assume the reverse is true (this never came up during any of the play-tests; as such the possibility wasn't envisioned nor addressed in the rules, but should and will be). Namely, a preceding air search results in the TF owner declaring it a "dummy."If a sub contact (or coastwatcher or surface TF contact, for that matter) then subsequently contacts that TF, during that same phase, and causes it to be "definitively revealed," then the "Report False" chit held by the TF owner is voided -- so long as the same air search assets which previously found it remain in range of that TF. In this case, the TF owner must immediately draw another search effectiveness chit, ignoring any "Report False" chits drawn, and provide the required contact report.

A clarification and pertinent errata ("exception," etc.) will be published to this effect.

Now, as to "what happens if the sub contact and air search occur simultaneously?" I'll have to think on that one a bit; I'm not sure if merely allowing the searching player to declare his air search first addresses this sufficiently -- or whether it would be advantageous tactically to do the opposite -- or not. Probably it does, but I'll do some pondering on this point.

1a- Why would a sub contact NOT result in the possibility of a special air strike being called? (just curious as to the reasoning behind this, or any historical background in this matter…)

ANS:
I'm unaware of any major airstrikes launched immediately solely on the basis of a sub contact report. Hence the prohibition.

2- When do aborted aircraft become un-aborted?

ANS:
At the conclusion of the Air or Naval Phase in which they were aborted.

3- When can inoperable AP's be made operable? (e.g. aircraft at airbases over the basing capacity which, after losses of some sort, are no longer 'overstacked'…)

ANS:
Air Point "inop" markers are eligible to be removed via A/F repair process, which occurs during the Engineering Segment of the Ground Phase. "Inop" AP's at damaged A/F's may have their "inop" status removed at that time, as per 11.5.7 (last paragraph), & 11.5.9.

"Inop" AP's at bases which are not damaged (e.g., perhaps becoming "inop" due to over-stacking) may have their "inop" status removed during the Engineering Segment also (and only at that time -- not, for example, merely at the instant the overstacking is redressed), to the extent that the base is no longer over-stacked.

4- The Japanese counter mix does not have any 'Hamp' or 'Zeke' aircraft. We assume, then, that all on-map

and yet-to be built Zero (A6M) type AP's 'become' Hamps or Zekes on certain dates. Is this correct? If not, how do we differentiate between them while in play?

ANS:
There is no functional difference merely with the names "Zero" and "Zeke." Zeros become "Zekes" as of 10/43. As per the A6M3 ("Hamp"), and how to differentiate them, see footnote (8): Japanese Air Point Charts 1941-2 / 1943.

In a message dated 11/20/2006 11:45:52 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:

1. Air point type (clarification): Do different models of a given airplane constitute different air point types (e.g., are an A6M2 and an A6M5 one air point type or two? I assume two.)?

ANS:
1. One. In the present example, A6M2's & A6M5's will not coexist. From 10/43 through 8/45, all A6M's (except for the potential "generic" A6M used as kamikazes) are assumed to be A6M5's.

As such, all AP's of a (main) given type within a given air block are considered to be a single AP type. Note that this applies to the A6M3 as well. These AP's will coexist with A6M2's for a time (see Japanese 1941-2 & 1943 Air Point Charts). For attrition loss purposes, A6M2's & A6M3's are considered the same AP type. As such, in apportioning attrition losses, the exact types lost (A6M2 vs. A6M3) must be done equally -- with any remainder apportioned as the Japanese player desires. Note that, since the A6M2-N ("Rufe") is part of the Fighter Air Block, this AP type is considered separate from Carrier Block A6M's.

Re the Japanese Ki-15/C5M2, these AP's are considered the same AP type, in that the Japanese player may consider them either "Army" or "Navy" types, at his discretion, for service-apportioned attrition loss purposes.

On the US side, the P-40 AP is an anomaly. Generally, all US P-40's will be of the same (lettered) variant model. But, some of the US P-40's starting at Clark Field are "E" models. The US player may consider all P-40's, including these "E" models, as the same AP type.

Note also that the US F4F-4 & FM-2 are considered the same AP type.

2. Air Transport/Air Assault: Rule 5.11.1 says that US C-54 APs have a Load Capacity of 1 ground step for air transport missions. Does this exception also apply to Air Assaults? Rule 5.12.1 doesn't mention a C-54 exception.

ANS:
2. Errata:

[5.11.1] 3rd sentence, change to read:
   Exception: US C-46 and C-54 AP's each have a Load Capacity of 1 ground step.

[5.12.1] Change 1st sentence to read:
   For Air Assault purposes, all transport ("C") type AP's have Load Capacities of 1/2 step of airborne units.

Note: I'm unaware of any US C-46's or C-54's being used in paradrop operations -- hence the artificial lowering of their load capacities for this mission type. It's probably a better compromise than an outright ban on this mission type for these two AP types, as certainly the C-46 could have (if indeed it wasn't) been used in this role.

3. Reaction movement: There appears to be a contradiction between Rule 8.1.3 (3rd column of p. 29, paragraph immediately under "Example (see Examples of Play
Booklet)") and Rule 17.5 (3rd column of p. 56, first paragraph). Is reaction movement alternating or

simultaneous (i.e., igo-yugo, each one hex at a time, OR both of us push pieces at literally the same time)?

ANS:
3. Definitely some clarification is in order here!

Reaction movement is "Igo-Yugo." The word "simultaneously" in 17.5 (3rd column, pg. 56, 1st paragraph) is misleading. Errata to this effect:

[17.5] Pg. 56, 3rd column, 1st paragraph, 3rd sentence:
  After "simultaneously," insert:
  (see **Procedure**, below)

[17.5] In the following ("**Procedure**") paragraph, last sentence, change to read:
  Once triggered, the reacting TF is immediately free to conduct normal movement, but it does so simultaneously with the triggering TF -- in that the reacting side moves one hex after being "triggered." Thereafter, each side (the triggering & reacting TF's) alternate moving one hex, until all reaction movement is concluded, so long as the hexes moved into have the same Naval MP cost.

(Add new paragraph):
If these hexes possess different Naval MP costs, then movement is expended on a MP cost basis,* rather than on a hex-by-hex basis. Possible exceptions: See 8.1.3 ("Carrier admiral REAC bonus") & 20.1 ("Surface admiral REAC bonus").

* (See *Examples of Play Booklet* addenda)

Examples of Play Booklet addenda (add to pg. 16):
[17.5] Reaction Mission

1) Hexes with same MP cost:
It is the outset of the 1st Naval Phase of G/T 3/5/42. A US carrier TF, at speed class 2 and commanded by Adm. Fletcher, sorties from Brisbane. It has a "Move/REAC" mission, and during its movement moves to its plotted destination hex of E2226 (expending 67 MP's).

A Japanese carrier TF, in E2018, also has a "Move/REAC" mission. With a plotted move to E1426, it begins moving SW, and in E1620 is "located" by US air search out of Queensland -- thus triggering the US carrier TF.

Prior to sortieing, a "6" was rolled in determining Adm. Fletcher's REAC rating -- meaning that the US TF will be penalized 1 REAC hex moved -- and this one hex penalty must be applied at the outset of the US TF's declared REAC movement.

Possessing a REAC movement maximum of 26 MP's [(120 - 67) / 2] at the outset -- a maximum of 4 hexes in the Tropical Movement Area, the US player declares his REAC move, and announces & applies his one-hex REAC penalty, enabling the Japanese player to continue his plotted move.

The Japanese TF moves 1 hex to E1521. With (now) 3 eligible REAC hexes remaining, the US TF moves to E2126. The Japanese TF is then moved to E1421, completing its plotted move. The US TF moves to E2025. Since the triggering TF has completed its move, this ends the US carrier TF's REAC movement.

Note that the US player could then launch a special strike (at range 42 MP's) with his SBD's at "extended" range, if he chooses.

2) Hexes with Different MP costs:
It is the outset of the 2nd Naval Phase of G/T 3/11/44. A US carrier TF, commanded by Adm. Clark, is in B2751. It is operating at speed class 2, with a "REAC" mission (with no plotted move for this Naval Phase).

A Japanese surface TF sorties from Okinawa (B2736). With a plotted move to B2247, it is contacted & attacked by a US subron in B2638 -- triggering the US carrier TF.

Prior to sortieing, a "6" (not "doubles") was rolled in determining Adm. Clark's REAC rating -- meaning that his TF will gain a 3-hex REAC bonus, which will not count against its allotted 60 eligible Naval REAC MP's. The US player will, for now, save this bonus.

Since the Japanese TF is moving in the Temperate Movement Area, & the US in the Tropical, reaction movement on the US part will be expended on a MP, not hex-by-hex basis.

The first hex moved into by the US TF is "for free," into B2750. At this point, running totals of respective MP's expended must be kept. The US TF may not expend (normal) REAC naval MP's (i.e., move a hex) unless his running MP total is other than zero and less than the Japanese TF's.

The following summarizes the hex-by-hex respective movements past this point:

IJN TF Movements / expenditures		USN TF Movements / expenditues	
B2539	5	(prohibited)	
B2439	10	B2649	6
B2340	15	B2648	12
B2240	20	B2548	18
B2241	25	B2547 - 2546 - 2445 - 2345 *	

* expending (in this case in total) his 3 "bonus hex" REAC moves.

Note that, had the US player not expended his bonus REAC hexes, then from that point onward both the triggering Japanese & reacting US TF would be expending MP's in the same movement area. Thus, any further REAC movement would revert to a hex-by-hex basis, until the US REAC movement allotment was expended, or REAC movement voluntarily halted.

____

Clarification, Naval REAC MP expenditures: Different movement areas.

If the per-hex Naval MP costs for the reacting TF are greater than that for the triggering TF, then for as long as this situation exists, except for the 1st hex entered (which is "free" for the reacting TF), the reacting TF may not expend REAC naval MP's unless its total cumulative expended REAC MP's are greater than zero and are less than the triggering TF's total cumulative expended after the REAC TF is triggered.

Exception: Admiral-provided REAC "bonus" hexes are not counted against this calculation, and continue to be expended on a hex-by-hex basis, rather than on a hex MP basis. See [17.5] Example of Play addenda.

If the per-hex naval MP costs for the reacting TF are less than that for the triggering TF, then the two TF's expend movement on a hex-by-hex basis (i.e., as if the movement areas were identical).

4. Game Turn Record Card: There seems to be an error on the MS Damage/Load Capacity chart. Shouldn't ADA's be APA's?

ANS:
4. Yes, missed that one! Errata:
Game-Turn Record Display:

MS Damage / Load Capacity" summaries:
Change "ADA's" to read "APA's"

5. Game Turn Record card, [33.0] Activation Costs: Ships, Note 1) (also Chartbook I, p. 26, Note 3.): If the Shinano is brought in as a BB, does it cost 5 CPs or 3CPs to activate?

ANS:
    3 if activated by "Combined Fleet" HQ; otherwise 6 CP's.

6. The Anti-Torpedo Rating of US CV 7 Wasp is printed as dark dots, not white. I assume the value is the same, despite the color.

ANS:
    Yes. The Wasp is a special case. Her anti-torpedo rating (of "3") is in effect only following a Yard
      Period, commencing with 1943.

7. The US 11th Airborne Division counter appears to be missing the parachute part of its unit symbol.

ANS:
7. It's deliberate. Only one of its regiments was a parachute infantry unit. Hence, only that regiment is air-assault-capable -- not the entire division.

8. FWIW: Credits (back of Examples of Play, Optional Rules, & Designer Notes booklet): Under First Edition (SPI), the word research is misspelled.

ANS:
8. Thanks, I can't claim credit for that one. I didn't have a chance to review that section prior to publication, and had no idea that DG was going to credit the original SPI team. So, I'll let them live with it :-)

In a message dated 11/21/2006 9:35:16 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:

Thanks for your prompt and thorough response to my WITP questions! Here's another one that I forgot to include:

[3.1 B. 3.] First Air Phase, Strike Segment (p. 7, 1st paragraph of column 3): This rule states "Using the same sequence and procedure as outlined above, each side sequentially resolves day air strikes (but not transfers)." Does this mean the die is rolled a second time to determine which side launches the first day strike (and then players alternate, as per the procedure for night strikes), or do players continue to use the first (original) die roll specified for this segment (i.e., the one discussed for night strikes) to determine the order of resolution for day strikes?

ANS:
No, the initial "initiative" DR governs the resolution of both night & day airstrikes for that phase.

In a message dated 11/22/2006 6:44:43 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:

I've been working up the rules to WITP for a go at my first game (Midway scenario), and I've found that I am unclear on a few points regarding fighter escort. These points are 1) at what point in the turn fighter escort is set and logged on the Strike Plot sheet,

ANS:
FTR escort postures for naval strikes are plotted during the Allocation Segment if the strike occurs during an Air Phase.

For special strikes (e.g., launched vs. TF's during Naval Phases), they're done during the Altitude & Escort

Segment [7.1] B 1, when the special strike is logged on the Air Strike Plot.

NOTE: The sub-section B. "Air Phase" in [7.1] might be confusing. It doesn't refer to game-turns' "Air Phases," but rather a separate phase within the Air/Surface strike sequence.

and 2) whether the Striking Player may set different escort postures for different altitudes of the same strike.

ANS:
Yes, different postures are allowed for different altitudes of the same strike. In fact, different postures are also allowed for the same altitudes of the same strike. See [6.1.1] "E" (pg. 22).

The overarching requirement with FTR escort postures is that they be clearly defined (i.e., "recorded") prior to actually launching the strike.

In a message dated 11/24/2006 8:26:42 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:

1. (Midway scenario, 63.4): Must both players roll Carrier Coordination in the historical (not the Random Option) version of the scenario?

ANS:
No "carrier coordination" DR's are made in the "historic" version of this scenario. All airstrikes / CAP arrive as scripted.

2. (General): At what point in an airstrike does the US player roll for his "Planes on Deck" column shift (42.4.3, p. 132)? IOW, does he get to know how many column shifts he'll receive by rolling for them prior to assigning targets (per 7.8.1, Step 1, p. 26), or must he assign targets per 7.8.1, Step 1, and then roll for his "Planes on Deck" column shifts?

ANS:
The "planes on deck" 2D6 DR is made prior to assigning targets in STEP 1 of [7.8.1].

I just finished my first game (historical Midway). The IJN lost Akagi and Soryu in the first strike, and the Hiryu was finished off in the second. The USN lost the Yorktown, which went down from a critical hit--even though the US CAP chased off the Kates, leaving only the Vals to press the attack. Nagumo and Fletcher both had to transfer their flags. It was quite close to history!

ANS:
During play-testing (I forget exactly how many run-throughs I did with the Midway scenario; probably 40 or so), the overall results were very close to those which occurred historically. But, the Midway battle is the hardest to use in analyzing the accuracy of all game mechanics involved, since there are so many assumptions necessary (i.e., how many "Magic" chits the US player has in his pocket; exactly how do the opposing admirals' performances translate into in-game ratings, etc.). So, it's a little artificial in that I had to assume certain conditions. Since luck played such a large part in that battle (indeed, in many others as well), the best you can do in evaluating how well the game's mechanics simulate reality is make an objective evaluation based on many play-tests, with as many variables input as practical.

Believe me, it's a lot more fun as the US player do try to pull a "Midway" off in a campaign game.

In a message dated 11/25/2006 12:33:12 PM Pacific Standard Time, Scarfar writes:

Rule 17.13.10 Activation, fuel grace Periods
Is there a limit on how often a given ship can do Port moves?

ANS:
No, no limit on "port-to-port" moves.

Rule 25.3.2 Japanese Jungle superiority
The British 53rd Brigade in Malaya is listed as not being subject to this rule but is not identified in the campaign set up.

ANS:
Delete the reference in [25.3.2] to the British 53rd Bde. Errata to this effect will be published shortly.

Rule 29.5 OSB's command link ranges
Can an OSB link to another OSB which in turn links to a headquarters? For instance if the Burma Army HQ is in Chittagong and has a OSB in Imphal, can an OSB in Mandalay link to the OSB in Imphal?

ANS:
Yes. If a HQ has more than one OSB deployable, only then may a command link be traced to it via multiple OSB's. The general rule stipulating that non-Beachhead OSB's may trace command links (oversea or overland) only to their parent HQ, of course applies.

Campaign set up and Campaign reinforcements
In the set up the 45th Indian Brigade is listed as being on the Global sea lanes but no TQ and strength information for this unit is given. Is there a special counter? If not what is the information?

ANS:
The general rule is that if no "hit" (read: step losses) apply to a specifically numbered (identified) unit, that unit (in this case its ratings are 4 0 3) arrives at its printed strengths.

Likewise in CW reinforcements for 2/42 Blackforce (BF) Bde has no information.

ANS:
If a unit is specified as having "1 hit," that is a one-step-loss reduction. In this case, the BF Bde would be a 5 0 2 Bde (i.e., with a "1" chit affixed to it signifying its one step loss.

I assume that the no AP attrition for the 13/41 cycle refers to the end of cycle attrition and not to attrition from other causes like multiple bombing missions in a single turn. Is this correct?

ANS:
Yes, the "no AP attrition" rule applies only to the Strategic G/T (cycle) attrition process, for G/T 0/13/41.

At the start of the campaign is their a CW Eastern Fleet Commander?

ANS:
No. Adm'l Somerville could be placed in command, at the standard CP cost. Ditto for Adm'l Phillips -- assuming, of course, he survives with "Force Z."

In a message dated 11/25/2006 5:58:29 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:

I'd like to request clarification RE several points involving admirals. I'm sure you'll discern the general pattern the questions share.

1. [8.1] (p. 29) states CV admirals roll their "A," "B," "C," and Attack DRM ratings "prior to combat." This is ambiguous. Does this mean 1) these ratings are rolled for once per sortie, before the first combat has occurred in that sortie (and thereafter apply to all combats during that sortie), or 2) these ratings are rolled for anew prior to every combat fought during that sortie (i.e., multiple combats = multiple ratings rolls)?

ANS:

The latter. But, "sortie," *for purposes of this rule*, is defined as:
  a) The duration of the TF's sortie if a single fueling period constitutes it   ***or***
  b) each fueling period within a TF's sortie -- if more than one

Example: A USN carrier TF (commanded by Adm'l Fletcher) sorties during 2N ("2nd Naval Phase") G/T 1/9/42. During 1A G/T 2/9/42, this TF is attacked by Japanese land-based air -- requiring a DR to determine Adm'l Fletcher's combat ratings. The Japanese air strike is resolved.
   During 3N G/T 2/9/42, this TF moves away and is refueled at sea. Returning to the combat area, during 1N G/T 3/9/42, a carrier battle is joined. Since this is a different fueling period within this TF's sortie, Adm'l Fletcher's combat ratings are rolled for anew prior to this carrier battle. His ratings as determined here would then apply for all combats fought by that TF during that fueling period, or until the TF is deactivated if done during that fueling period.

2. If the answer to question 1. above is 1), then are the "C" and DRM bonuses applied to one wave of every strike that takes place during that sortie, or do they apply to only one wave of one strike that occurs during that sortie--i.e., are the column shift and DRM bonuses each a one shot deal? (Note: it seems clearer that the "B" bonus is not a one off. The answer to question 1. should clear up any confusion surrounding it.)

ANS:
A carrier admiral's combat ratings are applied afresh for each combat action.

Example: A TF commanded by Adm'l Kinkaid is attacked by Japanese land-based air during 1A G/T 2/11/42. His combat ratings, as rolled for, include a Bounce Bonus of "B+1." That bonus is applied during air combat between USN CAP and Japanese escort FTR's during that phase.
   During the succeeding Naval Phase (1N G/T 2/1/42), Adm'l Kinkaid's TF launches an escorted strike of its own vs. an IJN carrier TF. Adm'l Kinkaid's Bounce Bonus of "B+1" is again applied during the resolution of air combat during the US air strike.

NOTE: As you'll note below, the procedures for duration of admiral's combat ratings will be different for carrier, surface, and amphibious-capable admirals.

3. The situation seems clearer wrt surface admirals ([20.0], [20.1], pp. 66-67). Yet just to clarify, are surface admirals' "S," "I," "B," and "N" ratings rolled anew prior to every surface engagement (i.e., multiple engagements = multiple rolls)?

ANS:
Yes. Unlike carrier admirals, surface admirals' combat ratings are determined anew for each separate surface engagement, regardless of how many of these may occur during a sortie/fueling period.

4. Similarly for amphibious-capable admirals ([21.1], p. 70): Are amphibious-capable admirals' Debarkation Bonus/Penalty, TQ Bonus, and Amphibious Assault Ground Combat DRM rolled for anew for every amphibious assault, or only rolled once per sortie, with the results applying to every amphibious assault that occurs during that sortie (i.e., multiple amphibious assaults = multiple ratings rolls)?

ANS:
For amphibious-capable admirals, their combat ratings apply for every amphibious assault launched by their TF during a single sortie (i.e., from initial activation to deactivation of the TF). Thus, their ratings, as initially determined, apply for <u>all</u> amphibious assaults occurring during that sortie.

5. At what point in the Joint Assault Segment are the TQ Bonus and Combat DRM die rolls (amphibious admirals, [21.1], p. 71) made?

ANS:

Immediately prior to the 1st amphibious assault combat resolution launched by that admiral's TF.

6. At what point in the turn are surface admirals' ratings rolled for (i.e., immediately prior to [19.2.1] (p.63)? Immediately prior to [19.3] (p.63)?)?

ANS:
The former.

In a message dated 11/27/2006 7:34:40 PM Pacific Standard Time, sda44@videotron.ca writes:

1- In the campaign scenario setups (68.4.1, pg 14), we assume that the hex # for Singapore should be B0109. Correct?

ANS:
1) Yes, correct.

1a- Referring to the same case above, how does the Eastern Fleet HQ (20 hex command radius) on Trincomalee reach it's OSB in Singapore? We counted more than a 20 hex distance between this HQ and it's OSB in Singapore. We thought there might be a second OSB in the setups, thinking that it might trace through that one to Singapore, but we didn't find it anywhere.

ANS:
1a) Oops! The 2nd OSB should be at Rangoon (errata pending).

1b- When building HQ-attached OSB's, we assume that they must be built within the parent HQ's command radius. If this is correct, how did the Eastern Fleet OSB end up in Singapore? We thought perhaps this OSB was previously built by another HQ, and subsequently attached to the Eastern fleet HQ. But since it's out of the range of the HQ itself, we wondered how even this would be possible. (my head hurts…;-)…

ANS:
1b) First, generally speaking, don't look for every pre-war unit/facility's location and/or status to necessarily fall within the rules. Though I can't think of any off-hand, there may be one or two that technically don't comport with the rules. That said, here's how it (pre-war) could've happened, specifically vis-a-vis the British Eastern Fleet HQ:

from **[29.5]** pg. 108, 2nd paragraph: "...may be built in any linked port/anchorage." Note that this doesn't specify that the prospective OSB location needs to be linked solely to its parent HQ -- only that it be linked. Now, certainly to *function* as an OSB, it must be linked to its parent HQ, but merely for construction purposes, the location itself must be linked (which Singapore is via the Malaya AG HQ, and Rangoon is via the Burma Army HQ).

2- In the fortification rules (39.7), it states that a unit initially activated for fortification purposes becomes a strength level 1 fort. What is it's initial SIZE, 1 as well, or equivalent to the steps in the unit fortifying?

ANS:
2) Its initial size, in this instance, is its present step strength.

Clarification: A unit may not attempt fortification *alone* to a higher size level than its printed step size.

Expanding the example in **[39.7.3],** pg. 126, 2nd column, 5th paragraph:
Assume the two (Japanese) units in the hex (and, assuming that it's jungle) are a "4-3" Rgt. & a "3-5" Bde. The current fort level in this hex is 8 (strength) / 3 (size). In order to upgrade the fort during this G/T, the Japanese player's options are:

STRENGTH UPGRADE:
    He may activate the 4-3 Rgt. alone and, applying a -2 DRM (-1 for the unit's TQ of "4;" -1 for the jungle

terrain), needing a "5+" for success.

He may activate both units, gaining a +1 DRM for the Bde's activation multiple (of "1") spent -- for a net DRM of -1; requiring a "6+." Note, however, that in this case a successful upgrade makes the fort a 9/3. Thus, only the Rgt. would be able to benefit fully from it.

or

SIZE UPGRADE:

In this case, he may <u>not</u> activate the Rgt. alone, since a unit cannot by itself upgrade to a fort level above its printed step strength.

He may activate the Bde. alone and, applying a -3 DRM (-2 for the unit's TQ of "3;" -1 for the jungle terrain), requiring a "4+" for success. A successful DR makes the fort an 8/4.

He may activate both units, and in this case (since the unit is not being activated *alone*) may designate the 4-3 Rgt. as the "lead" unit. Applying a -1 DRM (-1 for the TQ of the lead unit of "4;" -1 for the jungle terrain; +1 for the single additional unit activation multiple -- the Bde. -- spent), requiring a "6+" for success. A successful DR then makes the fort an 8/4.

Note that (per 39.7.1, last paragraph), unit activation costs are, by cycle, a one-time expense. Thus, for instance, using the last bullet above, DRM's for additional unit activation multiples would continue to apply, for as long as the unit(s) remain activated.

3- In the Burma scenario, where is the Japanese supply base located (if there is one)?

ANS:
3) To [67.4], pg. 7, immediately preceding [67.4.1], add:
   Note: For this scenario, Bangkok is linked (both by sea and overland) to an assumed Japanese Supply Base at Saigon (Map "B," not used in this scenario).

Also, the fortification in Rangoon is listed as Level-2. We assume strength level, but what about size?

ANS:
3) (cont.) Yes, it should read fort "2/2."

4- In rule 32.1, the first note states that a "base" is an AF, Seaplane base, or a port/anchorage. A later note states that a "base" is any installation (airfield, port) or ground unit. Which is correct?

ANS:
   The former. In **[32.1],** delete the Note sentence following "B) A friendly Supply Base"

4a- Also in this paragraph, it seems to state that ground units not on a "base" are considered in supply if they are linked to an in-supply HQ or OSB. Is this correct?

ANS:
4a) Yes.

4b- We understand that HQ's must occupy a port, anchorage, or an OSB (we assume an OSB from another HQ, correct?).

ANS:
Yes.

Having established this, an HQ will be in supply if it's "base" is in supply. Sounds good so far. However, if the HQ occupies an OSB, and the OSB occupies a named-location (which is allowed as per rule 29.5), how does the HQ here draw supply? I guess the question should simply be; How does an HQ draw supply? Does a linked HQ need to draw supply?

ANS:
4b (cont.) First, no advantage would be gained by co-locating a HQ with its OSB.

If a linked HQ occupies a base which is not fully-supplied, then ground units in hexes not containing bases which are linked to this HQ suffer supply penalties according to the supply penalty category of the HQ's hex.

Ground units occupying "base" hexes trace supply according to [32.1].

4c- When tracing supply overland (32.3), is it possible to trace through rail, then overland, then back onto rail, then overland again, and so forth, or is it a single shot of rail per supply link?

ANS:
4c) The former.

5- Rule 5.1.2 speaks of 'operational losses' of AP's. Isn't a loss of AP's simply a loss? Is the loss within the context of this rule any different from any other kind of 'loss'?

ANS:
5) The word "operational" here is misleading, since it is not defined. It doesn't refer to a specific game mechanic. Rather, it (awkwardly) attempts to explain why this additional potential attrition is checked for -- namely, that the mechanic reflects additional non-combat losses of AP's.

Are these losses counted as others are (for air block replacement purposes)?

ANS:
5) (cont.) Yes, these special operational attrition losses are counted (and tracked) as normal AP losses.

6- A ghost of questions past… Rule 5.9 refers to the 'normal' entrain/detrain cost of 5 rail MP's. Rule section 35.0 makes no mention of this 'cost'. What are we missing?

ANS:
6) Good catch. Errata:
[5.9] Rail Movement Interdiction   pg. 18, 2nd paragraph, change to read:
  The cost to entrain/detrain in an interdicted rail hex is the normal *Railcap* cost to entrain/detrain [35.1.1] plus..."

In a message dated 11/28/2006 9:42:28 AM Pacific Standard Time, Vincent.Frattali@ihs.gov writes:

Does a definitively revealed task force every lose this status?

ANS:
There is no "definitively-revealed" status, per se. The only thing being "definitively-revealed" does is bar the owning player from falsely announcing a de facto actual Task Force as a "dummy TF." As such, there is no "tracking" or marking of Task Forces as having been "definitively-revealed."

In the historical Midway strike can the Americans duplicate history without the Japanese rolling less than 4 on the AA table?

ANS:
This is impossible to answer. How does the IJN CAP do? How many attacking waves are formed by the US strike, and how are they constituted? How are the IJN ships deployed on the Air/Surface Display? All these

(and probably more) variables will change from play-through to play-through of this scenario.

In 12.1 Table "Before enemy strike" result are any hits also eligible for a critical hit in addition to auto critical hit given by the table against carriers?

ANS:
Yes, the normal critical hits are determined normally, in addition to the automatic one vs. carriers.

In a message dated 11/28/2006 2:19:05 PM Pacific Standard Time, Vincent.Frattali@ihs.gov writes:

1.   How are negative S ratings handled (rolls less than 1 on surface admiral)

ANS:
(errata):
[20.1] pg. 68, **SURFACE COMBAT VALUE**, 1st column. Add new paragraph at the end of this section (immediately preceding *BREAKOFF LEVEL VALUE:*

Procedure: Admirals with Negative Ratings:
Admirals commanding surface TF's whose rolled-for combat ratings indicate "S- __" (e.g., a net DR of " 1" for USN Adm'l Glassford in 1942 -- in this case resulting in an "S - 4" rating) have these negative surface combat value ratings applied in sequence in the following order:

1. Remove a number of positive surface combat ("1") counters from that TF's rolled-for subordinate admiral (if any) up to the negative total possessed by the TF's commander.

2. Add any remainder negative "S" ratings, in an alternating fashion (starting with the TF commander) to the opposing surface admirals (commander + one subordinate designated by the opposing player). If no subordinate enemy admiral is present, the opposing TF commander receives all the remainder.

These allocations are then added to any (positive) "S" chits already possessed by these admirals.

In the event that no opposing enemy admiral is present, add half (rounded *up*) of the total negative "S" ratings to the enemy TF -- to be used as if there were a TF commander present during the succeeding battle.

2.   How do inoperable aircraft become operable again (What phase). Is it different if you air transfer without CP's?

ANS:
No, not different. Air Point "inop" markers are eligible to be removed via A/F repair process, which occurs during the Engineering Segment of the Ground Phase. "Inop" AP's at damaged A/F's may have their "inop" status removed at that time, as per 11.5.7 (last paragraph), & 11.5.9.

"Inop" AP's at bases which are not damaged (e.g., perhaps becoming "inop" due to over-stacking) may have their "inop" status removed during the Engineering Segment also (and only at that time -- not, for example, merely at the instant the overstacking is redressed), to the extent that the base is no longer over-stacked.

Deleted duplicate material removed here.

In a message dated 12/14/2006 6:08:52 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:
Hi Kevin,

I have two WITP questions about surface combat:

1. (Clarification): [19.9.5], 2nd paragraph (col.1, p. 66): I assume the "withdrawal area" is the same thing as the Surface/Surface Tactical Display's "Withdrawal Zone."
Hello Russ:

1. Yes, correct.

2. [19.9.9] (col. 2, p. 66): What happens if ALL the hexes a TF might be placed in contain enemy TFs (or are hexes in which naval movement would not ordinarily be allowed)?
2. If all the eligible placement hexes adjacent to the combat hex contain enemy TF's, then determine one of them (if more than one) randomly, and place the withdrawing TF in that hex. Determine contact between the withdrawing TF and the enemy TF(s) in that hex normally [16.4] -- noting that the Engagement Value for the withdrawing TF will normally be "zero" (see 17.16.1) -- with the withdrawing TF considered the *Bravo TF*. If the subject hex contains more than one enemy (*Alpha*) TF, determine which one is rolled for (for "contact") randomly.

BTW, for completeness' sake, you might want to address the strat map misalignment problem somewhere in the errata or FAQ, esp. since DG hasn't done anything about this. Just a thought, FWIW.
Yes, I will include this DG glitch in the next batch of errata. Thanks!

Kevin

In a message dated 12/16/2006 7:03:20 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:
A few things came up as I've worked through the rules prior to doing the Java Sea scenario:

1. [19.4.6] (p. 64) mentions effects for BB/BC firing at DD, DE, or CD. The note underneath the Surface/Surface Damage Table ([19.4.7], Chartbook I, p.11) adds APD and DET to this list. Which is correct? (I assume the latter.)
Hello Russ:

1. Correct. Errata:
Rulebook I, **pg. 64:**
[19.4.6] Change 1st sentence to read:
    "BB or BC's firing at DD, DE, or CD types (see **Surface/Surface**

Damage Table; *Chartbook I*) <u>in adjacent hexes</u>..."

3. [19.8.1] (p.65): I assume that when one calculates the Breakoff Level, one uses the actual Defense Strength of ships that were damaged prior to the commencement of that surface combat (IOW, damaged ships will use whatever [16.8] (Chartbook I, p. 12) gives them, instead of using their printed Defense Strengths for the Breakoff Level calculation).
Correct. Use their <u>current</u> (not necessarily the printed) Defense Strength.

BTW, it might be awhile before I can definitively answer your question about the main-map jungle-island symbology. I have to find the original maps I submitted to Joe Youst.

Kevin

In a message dated 12/17/2006 9:47:49 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:
As I worked through it, your answer to my second question opened a whole can of worms, so here goes. Before I dive in, though, let me say that the reference you gave to [17.16.1] confused me until I read further and caught [17.16.4]. You really need to take both together. I suggest referencing both if you include this question in the FAQ. Now on to bigger and better things!
Hello again:

You're right. I'll amend that answer. Thanks!

1. [16.4.6] confuses me. TFs alternate movement [16.0] (p.48, col. 1, 2nd paragraph), so the only way it is possible to have more than one friendly TF in a hex is to have one start the naval phase in the hex (which would be governed by [16.4.8]) and then another moved in, or for one TF to enter the hex during a naval phase and then another enter it later that same naval phase.
1. Or if they moved together, linked.
Now a problem with both these cases is that contact is checked whenever a TF *enters* a hex ([16.4]), which means that [16.4.6] would be obviated because contact would in each case be checked for the given hex twice in the same naval phase (and for both cases, at different times). Perhaps [16.4.6] refers to more than one *enemy* TF?
1. (cont.) No, the wording is correct. And, this will occur only if there are

more than one friendly TF moving into the engagement hex, linked. This makes more sense, although the procedure in paragraph one wouldn't square with your answer to question 2. (from my previous email below), because you would have random vs. sequential contact determination for hexes containing more than one enemy TF. Now this leads to another question about naval engagement:

2. For Naval Engagement ([16.4]), what is the contact determination procedure for a TF that enters a hex containing more than one enemy TF? The enemy TF's are (secretly) ranked in EV's, highest-to-lowest, by their owning player. Engagement is then checked for the highest enemy EV (which the owning player must openly announce) present. If equal, determine randomly which TF is checked for first. After determining "contact" with the 1st TF (and after surface combat if it ensued), so long as the friendly TF has not "withdrawn" from surface combat, continue this process for each remaining enemy TF.

3. Finally, there seems to be a catch-22 situation concerning Naval Engagement (specifically, contact determination) wrt dummy TFs. [13.6.3] states that surface TF contact definitely reveals a TF, and the last sentence of [13.6.2] states that a dummy TF marker is removed from the map only if it is definitely revealed. The catch is that one needs to go through the contact procedure ([16.4]) in order to remove a dummy TF. This means that, unless the dummy is stationary (which would obviate the problem by triggering [16.4.1], which only requires the *Alpha* TF's EV), the dummy TF must have an EV. But per [13.6.1], movement plots--but *not* mission *types* (which implies the assignation of an EV to the dummy TF) are specified for dummy TFs. This means that, save for the stationary dummy TF case, dummy TFs need an EV to be revealed as dummy TFs, yet dummy TFs don't have EVs such that this can happen. Any help you can offer here would be appreciated.
Clarification: All dummy TF's have an EV of "0."

Kevin

Russ:

Ignore the terrain key symbol. There are no such islands. I checked with my originally-submitted master list and designated none for that symbol. IIRC I was going to put one around the Stewart Is. but either forgot or figured the green color showed well enough on the main map that it wasn't

necessary.

Kevin

In a message dated 12/14/2006 6:25:35 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:
The terrain key on strat map A has an "Island (Jungle)" symbol, but I can't find any such hexes on any strat map. What's going on here?

In a message dated 1/3/2007 8:25:31 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:
A few more WITP rules questions have come up as I've been working up the Trincomalee scenario:

1. (Clarification): [4.4.6] Must any airbases involved (originating/staging) be announced for air *assault* missions?
Hello Russ:

1. Yes. All air assault missions must be announced and conducted openly. This includes *any* airbases involved, whether they are within range of enemy air recce (or combat AP's) or not.

2. [13.5.4], air points lost via intensive air search: how are the lost APs chosen (given that more than one type of AP fulfills the criteria set out in the text beneath the table)?
They are chosen randomly, using the referenced criteria.

Finally, I think I uncovered another erratum: Examples of Play booklet, [8.1.3]: 1st DR should be 8 - 5 + 1 = **4** (this adds up to Kinkaid's value of 6).
Indeed you did. Errata:

Examples of Play Booklet, pg. 3:
[8.1.3] Carrier Admiral *REAC* Rating:
3rd paragraph, 2nd line. Change to read:
   "...calculated as **"6"** (1st DR: 8 - 5 + 1 = 4..."

Kevin

In a message dated 1/5/2007 10:04:27 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:

1. Hidden Naval Movement [16.1.6], Enemy *subrons* (p. 49, col. 1): The rules state that the TF player must roll as if making an enemy sub search for the opposing side. There is a problem, though, if this roll can be made at different ranges from the subron counter. There is nothing requiring the roll to be made at the shortest distance. As it stands right now, the TF player can make the roll at the longest (= most advantageous to him) distance. This looks like a loophole. This situation obtains even given *known* modifiers (the question then boils down to how one determines which distance to use, given a choice).
Hello Russ:

Good point there. Erratum:

Rulebook I, pg. 49
[16.1.6] 1st column, 4th paragraph ("Enemy *subrons*..."):
At the end of the 3rd sentence (ending "...apply."), insert an asterisk*

(Insert the followng new 4th sentence there):

* "Moreover, the sub search DR must be made using the shortest hex distance that applies during that TF's movement in proximity to the subject *subron*."

The second problem spot appears to be an erratum.

2. Changing Speed Class: Restrictions [18.2.1], 3. **Speed Class 1**: One gets **3** active phases at speed 2 for every **2** active phases at speed 1? IOW, you *gain* active phases by increasing speed? This looks backwards. #s 1. and 2. (immediately preceding) don't work this way.
This one I'm not actually sure of. In the play-test rulebook, which governed both full play-tests, the formula for Speed Class 1 ships converting to Speed Class 2 gave them two, not three active phases at SC 2 -- giving them the same total maximum MP capability (336) as they would possess with four active phases at SC1.

Now, the reason I'm not sure is that we might have changed that in order to provide such ships more overall MP capability. As we speak, I'm not sure of that, or of the reason for it. I'm going to have to dig into my work product files and notes (they're voluminous) in order to track this down.

This will take some time. I'd say it's 50-50 that the present rules contain a typo, and that it should be as noted above. I'll get back with you on this when I figure it out.

Kevin

In a message dated 1/12/2007 5:59:34 PM Pacific Standard Time, russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:
Hello Kevin!

Several more things have come up as I continue to digest this monster.

1. Trincomalee scenario, [65.5]: Are the CW Blenheims IV or IV Fs (both are available per the '41-'42 AP chart)?
Howdy Russ:

1. They may function in either role (either as HF's or B-types).

2. Who sets up first in the Trincomalee, Coral Sea, Burma, and Campaign scenarios? There are variable set up units in each, and the setup order might impact strategy. Note: the Burma scenario discusses ground unit deployment, but there are air units (not discussed) that have a variable setup. Similarly, the Campaign scenario only discusses deployment in China.
2. TRINCOMALEE Scenario deployment sequence: The variable CW land-based AP deployments are recorded in advance but need not be announced. All naval deployments, for both sides, are recorded in advance, then placed simultaneously prior to the start of play once each side announces "ready."

BURMA Scenario deployment sequence: Japanese variable AP deployments are done as per the "TRINCOMALEE" scenario, above. All variable-deployment ground unit deployments are done as per 67.2.4.

CORAL SEA Scenario deployment sequence: All variable AP deployments are done as per the "TRINCOMALEE" scenario, above. All subron deployments are plotted (recorded) simultaneously and revealed prior to start of play once each side announces "ready."

Re the CAMPAIGN Scenario, per 69.1, the exact sequence is:
1) 69.1.1
2) 69.1.2

3) 3rd paragraph, 69.1.3

3. [68.1]: I think the reference to 1946 should be to 1945 (see [71.0]).
No. The reference in 71.0 ("...prior to 1946...") pertains to allied victory.
The game may well continue into 1946 (but no further) -- producing either
a Japanese victory (of various levels) ora draw. See the **CONQUEST
VICTORY TABLE [71.3.2], pg. 31** in the *Scenarios & Campaign
Reinforcements booklet.*

4. [9.0]: For AP availability purposes, if some APs of the same type are
elite and some are not, may the player *choose* to take the actually
available APs from the elite APs, or is this (which of the actually available
APs are elite and which are not) determined randomly? Note: a similar
problem might arise if one also has APs of the same type that are green.
One might even have trained, trained elite, and green APs of the same air
type to adjudicate for purposes of [9.0].
The latter (randomly; in all cases).

Kevin

In a message dated 1/12/2007 8:29:27 PM Pacific Standard Time,
russelldumke@sbcglobal.net writes:
Hello Kevin,

Rule [8.2] says that each cv rated admiral must be aboard a separate,
operational carrier. However, Force "B" (Trincomalee scenario, [65.5]) has
2 cv admirals and only 1 carrier. What do I do? Boyd looks like the odd
man out.
Russ:

Clarification (doh): The "Admirals" section therein does not pertain only to
Force "B." It should be double-spaced below that Force and not indented.
As such, those 3 may be assigned to either force.

Kevin

**In a message dated 1/15/2007 5:12:45 PM Pacific Standard Time,
RUSSELLDUMKE@SBCGLOBAL.NET writes:
Here are a few items related to search in WITP.**

**1. If a Movement Area boundary crosses through an air search range
band, do the air search values of the searching APs change when**

they cross into a different Movement Area (ref. [13.1.1])? Example: In the Trincomalee scenario, the IJN Ryujo TF (Ryujo + at start assigned CAs, CL, & DDs) is located in the Tropical Movement Area. A CW MSU has moved closer to Calcutta, moving into the Temperate Movement Area. Air Search from the Ryujo TF, searching for the CW MSU TF, therefore originates in the Tropical Movement Area, but searches a hex in the Temperate Movement Area, where the CW MSU TF is located. Does this affect the IJN search value used to search for the CW MSU TF?

Hello Russ:

The movement area used in determining a carrier-based Air Point search value is that for the area the carrier is in at the time the search is launched. As such, no -- the search values do not change by nature of the searched hex and launching TF occupying different movement areas.

2. And here is a related question: One may only search for *moving* TFs if air searching during a Naval Phase ([13.3]). Does the hex a TF *begins* its move in count for this purpose (i.e., assuming the TF moves out of the hex it starts in--thus "moving"--does the hex it starts in qualify as a searchable hex?

Yes, it counts as a "searchable" hex.

Note: the "*entering* the hex" provision disqualifies Coastwatchers from searching for TFs that *begin* their movement in a search-eligible hex, but immediately move out of it ([13.8]).

Yes, this was intentional.

Kevin