

"How the Union was Saved" is a beer-and-pretzels, two-player, game based upon the conflict between the United States and the Confederate States of North America during 1861 – 1865. One player controls the forces of the United States, the "Union" hereinafter; the other the forces of the Confederate States, the "Confederacy" hereinafter.

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1.0 GAME COMPONENTS.

Game components comprise the following:

- One game map covering the eastern states of North America, overlaid with a hexagonal grid;
- 18 Confederacy and Union Field Army Sleighs;
- One set of sticky labels;
- 61 die-cut commander counters;
- 232 die-cut counters and markers;
- Two Fog of War screens;
- 40 Random Event Cards;
- Two six-sided dice [d6]: one blue, one grey;
- Extended Example of Play;
- These Rules.

2.0 GAME MAP.

The hexagonal game map represents the eastern part of North America. Each hex represents about 100 km (62 miles) from edge to edge. Terrain-types and their effects are explained below and are summarized on the Terrain Effects Chart, printed on each player's Fog of War screen.

Hexes are either passable or impassable.

Passable hexes are Clear (including those hexes with cities/ports), Coastal (containing both land and sea), Forest, Marsh, and Rough Terrain. Forest, Marsh, and Rough hexes are "difficult terrain" and, as such, affect supply, movement and combat.

Hexes containing only Sea are impassable for all field armies and supply routes [Exception: Rule 16.4 ("Movement by sea")].

Some hexes are separated by Rivers, designated by thick blue lines. These are of two types: navigable and non-navigable. Navigable rivers can facilitate the movement of supplies; but, can only be traversed by field armies or supplies via railroad bridges or crossing points. Non-navigable rivers can be traversed by field armies; but, interrupt supply and affect combat.

Some hexes are joined by railroads which facilitate the movement of field armies and supplies.


The territory to the north of the red line running east to west across the map comprises the United States; that to the south comprises the Confederate States. The hexes enclosed by the red line represent Kentucky which begins the game as a neutral state. [See Special Rule 19.1.]

3.0 FIELD ARMIES.

The Confederate and Union players each control several **Field Armies**.

Definition - Field Army: A **Field Army** comprises one (1+) or more combat units, up to a maximum of twelve (12), and one (1+) or more commanders, occupying the same hex. It is represented on the game map by a **Field Army Sleigh**.

Before the game begins players should stick two identical letters, ("A" - "A" or "B" - "B", etc.) from the sheet of sticky labels provided, to the front and back of the base of each sleigh. This allows both players to see the designation of each field army deployed on the game map. See also Section **6.0 Commanders**.



Thus each field army sleigh is identified by a letter ("A", "B", "C", etc.), which corresponds to the letter on the Field Army Box for **that** field army printed adjacent to the game map. [See Section **5.0 FIELD ARMY BOXES.**]

• There are **eight (8) Confederate** and **ten (10) Union Field Army Sleighs**. These are the **maximum** number of field armies which can exist at any time. **If there is no field army sleigh available, a new field army cannot be created.**

• Within those limits field armies can be created, augmented, split, merged and/or eliminated throughout the game. [See Section **16.0 MOVEMENT AND**


COMBAT and Section **18.0 REINFORCEMENTS AND GARRISONS.**]

- If a field army “disappears” as the consequence of merging with another field army or is eliminated by losses suffered through combat or a lack of supplies, its sleigh is removed from the game map and can be re-used if and when a new field army is created.
- No more than one (1) friendly field army can ever **occupy** a given hex. This restriction applies at all times. (See Rules 16.2 and 16.11.b for situations where one (1) friendly field army enters or moves through a hex occupied by another.)

4.0 FIELD ARMY COMPOSITION.

Each field army contains **Combat Units**.

There are **three (3) types** of combat unit: artillery, infantry, and cavalry. Army organisation differed between the two sides and evolved as the war progressed, ad hoc formations were often created out of necessity, and units were frequently chronically under-strength. So, at the strategic scale of this game, it is difficult to say what each combat unit represents with any accuracy or consistency. With this caveat in mind, as a (very) rough rule of thumb, each full-strength artillery unit could perhaps be seen as a brigade and each full-strength infantry or cavalry unit as a division.



Combat units do not appear on the game map. Instead, the **NUMBER** of full-strength and weakened combat units of each type in each field army is indicated by placing Field Army Detail Markers in the appropriate Field Army Boxes printed adjacent to the game map [see Section **5.0 FIELD ARMY BOXES**].

Each combat unit is always part of a field army and can only move as such, even if this necessitates the temporary creation of a new field army (which must be accompanied by a commander(s)) for a single move during the MOVEMENT AND COMBAT phase: for example, when a combat unit(s) leaves one field army and moves to join another. [See Rule 16.2. and the Extended Example of Play.]

5.0 FIELD ARMY BOXES.

Confederate and Union Field Army Boxes are printed adjacent to the map. These record the composition of the field armies in play on each side.

For each field army, players place Field Army Detail Markers within its Field Army Box to indicate the current number of each type of combat unit, and how many are full-strength or weakened. The Confederate


Markers are grey, the Union Markers are blue. Each Marker is double-sided with the numbers 1-4 on one side and 5-8 on the other. **Red numbers** represent units at **full-strength**, **black numbers** represent **weakened** units. They can be flipped and rotated so that the “top” number in each field army’s box designates the current number of each combat unit-type in that field army. [See Example below.] Markers annotated with the number “4” are available and should be placed under the appropriate 5-8 marker if there are more than eight (8) units of a particular type.

• **Players should always keep their Field Army Boxes up to date to reflect the current composition of each field army.**

• **A player’s Field Army Boxes should always be kept out of sight of his opponent. See Rule 8.0.**

Field Army Box Example.

*The example below shows the **Field Army Box** for Confederate Field Army “D”. This field army comprises six (6) units of infantry and one (1) of artillery at full-strength; two (2) weakened infantry units; and, one (1) weakened cavalry unit. A total of ten (10) combat units represented by four (4) **Field Army Detail Markers** rotated so that the appropriate number sits at the top.*





During the MOVEMENT AND COMBAT phase and the REINFORCEMENTS AND GARRISONS phase, field armies may be created, augmented, split, merged, or eliminated. Whenever a field army is created, the owning player places a new field army sleigh on the game map and records its composition by placing **Field Army Detail Markers** in the appropriate **Field Army Box**. If the new field army is created from an existing field army, the **Field Army Detail Markers** should be adjusted to reflect the units which have left the transferor field army. If a field army is eliminated its **Field Army Box** (and sleigh) can be re-used if and when a new field army is created.

6.0 COMMANDERS.

Command units are represented by counters. There are two (2) types: “junior” and “senior”; and each type is divided into two (2) classes: level 1 and level 2. [Exception: Special Rule 19.2, Robert E Lee].

Each junior commander counter has a "command rating" [CR] signified by a digit next to a crossed sabre and rifle symbol specifying the number of combat units the commander is able to command during combat [Rule 16.9]. In addition to a CR, counters for senior commanders have a "senior commander rating" [SCR] signified by a digit next to a kepi symbol which specifies the number of junior commanders the senior commander is able to command.



Commander counters automatically move with the field army to which they are attached. Each field army must be accompanied at all times by at least one (1+) commander. A commander cannot leave a field army unless the army is also accompanied by another commander(s) who will remain with that army. Subject to this stipulation (and Rules 16.3 and 16.4), during the MOVEMENT AND COMBAT phase a commander may transfer from one field army to another.

A senior commander with the highest SCR accompanying a field army, or a junior commander with the highest CR if no senior commander is present, is designated as **army commander**. His counter is inserted into the field army's sleigh on the game map (owning player's choice if two (2+) or more commanders are of equal rank). Any other commander counter(s) accompanying a field army is placed with the **Field Army Detail Markers** for that army in the appropriate **Field Army Box** so that, like the Field Army Details Markers for combat units, it is out of sight of the opponent.

7.0 PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.

A garrison counter of the appropriate side is placed on each permanent fortification at the start of the game. The counter cannot move and remains in situ

unless and until the fortification is captured when it is replaced by an enemy garrison counter. It, too, remains in situ until and unless the permanent fortification is recaptured. [Rule 16.13]

During the MOVEMENT AND COMBAT phase a field army is permitted to pass through a friendly permanent fortification, but may not end its move there.

Garrison counters may also be deployed upon captured cities [see Rule 18.0].


8.0 GAME SET-UP.

The Union player should sit to the north of the game map, the Confederate player to the south.

Each player places his Fog or War screen upright on the green line printed adjacent to the game map so as to prevent the opponent seeing his Field Army Boxes.

Each player then consults his white "Initial Set Up" box printed adjacent to the game map. He places on the game map the field army sleighs (with the counter for the most senior commander inserted in each), garrisons, and redoubts as specified. He then allocates to the Field Army Boxes for the field armies which begin the game counters for the remaining commanders and Field Army Detail Markers to represent the combat units.

All commanders are **level 1** and all combat units are **weakened** to represent their lack of experience and training. [Exception: Special Rule 19.2, Robert E. Lee]



9.0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY.

The game is played in at most seventeen (17) turns. Each turn represents approximately three (3) months of actual time from April 1861 to May 1865. Turns 4, 8, 12, and 16 are Winter Turns [see Rules 15.0 and 16.3]. Turns 5, 9, and 13 are Spring Turns for which Rule 17.0 applies.

Each turn is made up of several phases, each of which must be completed by both players before moving onto the next phase. The phases and their sequence of play are set out below. Once these phases have been completed, the turn comes to an end. Players should advance their Turn Marker to the "next" box on their Turn Track.

- Kentucky (first few turns only, see Special Rule 19.1);
- Random Events;
- Determine Turn Resource Points;
- Construct Redoubts;
- Depot Actions;
- Supply Status;
- Movement and Combat;
- Combat Experience (Spring turns only);
- Reinforcements and Garrisons.

10.0 WINNING THE GAME.

If at the end of any turn, Washington or all three (3) Union PSS cities [see Rule 14.0], is/are occupied by a Confederate field army(ies), depot(s) or garrison(s), the Confederate player gains an immediate victory.

If at the end of any turn, all three (3) Confederate PSS [see Rule 14.0], are occupied by a Union field army(ies), depot(s) or garrison(s), the Union player gains an immediate victory.

If the Confederate player lays Random Event Card 35, and the relevant circumstances apply, the Confederate player gains an immediate victory.

Otherwise, at the end of Turn 17 the Confederacy wins if it retains at least twelve (12) cities within the Confederacy unoccupied by a Union depot, field army and/or garrison, and connected by a railroad network running through hexes unoccupied by a Union depot, field army or garrison.


Any other outcome is a draw.

11.0 RANDOM EVENT CARDS.

11.1 Overview.

There are four (4) decks each of ten (10) Random Event Cards [RECs], one for each year: 1861, 1862, 1863, and 1864. Each deck should be shuffled and placed beside the game map. Each player then draws a single REC from the top of the 1861 deck.

The RECs drawn on Turn 1 are not played on Turn 1; but, are held in each player's hand.



Beginning on Turn 2, immediately following the 1d6 roll for Kentucky if such rolls are still required (see Special Rule 19.1), each player draws a REC from the deck for the appropriate year, so that he has two (2) cards in his hand, one (1) of which he must lay immediately for **that** turn (that is, before Turn Resource Points are determined). For Turns 1 – 8, the Union player is the first to draw and declare his REC; for Turns 9 – 17, the Confederate player leads.

Note: on Turn 17 each player will only have one (1) card in his hand, see below.

11.2 Playing the Random Event Cards.

Unless it is a "Single Instruction Card" (see below), each player implements the instructions on the REC he has played pertaining to his side (only). The instructions are implemented immediately or during the appropriate phase of the turn, and the REC is then placed on the discard pile. If those instructions cannot be carried out, the card is simply discarded. Each player is then left with one (1) REC in his hand until the process of drawing a REC is repeated at the start of the following turn.

When a new game year begins, the remaining cards left in the previous year's REC deck are discarded. Each player draws one (1) REC from the REC deck for the new game year, and adds it to the REC he is still holding from the previous game year so that he again has two (2) RECs to chose from. [Exception: for Turn 17 (Spring 1865) each player lays the REC he is still holding after the Winter 1864 Turn.]

A few RECs contain only a single set of instructions. If drawn, such a card cannot be retained, but must be played immediately after the opposing player lays his card, irrespective of who would otherwise be first to lay. Single instruction cards override any contrary instructions on the REC laid by the opposing player. (If both players draw single instruction cards the normal order of play is maintained.)

12.0 DETERMINE TURN RESOURCE POINTS.

Definition - Resource Points [RPs]: represent the logistical capability of each side to wage war. They are used to construct redoubts, establish new depots, maintain existing depots, activate units, and to move units.

Each player determines the Total Resource Points [TRPs] available for his use in the current turn by rolling 2d6: one (1) blue (positive) and one (1) grey (negative). These positive and negative roll results are combined arithmetically, and the net result is added to each player's base RPs for the current turn (per the Turn Track, number printed adjacent to the flag) to yield his TRPs for the current turn.

Example: If the Union player has nine (9) base RPs for the current turn, the positive die roll result is six (6) and the negative die roll result is three (3), the net result (6 – 3) is plus three (+3). This is added to his base RPs of nine (9) to yield TRPs of twelve (12). If the positive die roll had been two (2) and the negative die roll four (4), the net result (2 – 4) would have been minus two (-2), giving him seven (7) TRPs.


The RPs available for a Turn may also be adjusted by RECs and by Optional Rule 20.1.

Unspent RPs cannot be carried forward to subsequent turns.



Players use their Resource Points Markers to keep track of the number of RPs they spend during each turn on their Resource Points Track printed adjacent to the game map.

13.0 CONSTRUCT REDOUBTS.



Having established the number of TRPs they have available, players alternate in placing Redoubt Markers upon hexes in which they have built redoubts.

The Confederate player begins the sequence.

If, at any point in the sequence, a player declines to construct a redoubt he gets no further opportunity to do so during the current Turn, although his opponent may continue to do so until he, too, is unable or unwilling to continue.

A redoubt may be constructed only in a clear hex (including those containing cities and/or railroads) which is occupied by a friendly field army. Garrisons cannot construct redoubts. No more than one (1) redoubt may be constructed per hex.

The cost of constructing each redoubt is one (1) RP.

If, subsequently, the hex is no longer occupied by a field army the Redoubt Marker is immediately removed. [Exception: the redoubts at Richmond and Washington remain in place irrespective of whether or not they are occupied by field armies. If a Union field army occupies Richmond it gains the benefit of the redoubt.]

14.0 DEPOT ACTIONS.

Definition - Primary Supply Source: A Primary Supply Source [PSS] is a principal source of friendly supply. For the Union it is Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. For the Confederates it is Augusta, Raleigh and Selma.

Definition - Depot: A depot is a local source of supply for friendly combat units.

14.1 Depot Actions Overview.


During the DEPOT ACTION phase, players alternate establishing new depots on the game map (and/or removing a maximum of one (1) existing depot). The player with the higher TRP initiates the sequence. If both players have the same TRP, the Union player begins.

If, at any point in the sequence, a player declines to establish (or remove) a depot he gets no further opportunity to do so during the current turn, although his opponent may continue to do so until he, too, is unable or unwilling to continue.

14.2 Establishing New Depots.

Definition - Friendly Cities: At the start of the game all cities within the Union are friendly to the Union; all cities within the Confederacy are friendly to the Confederacy. This remains so unless and until a city is occupied by a field army of the opposing side. At that point it is "captured". A captured city is friendly to the opposing side for so long as it is occupied by a field army, garrison or depot of the opposing side. [See Special Rule 19.1 for Kentucky].

Definition - Friendly Permanent Fortifications: Each permanent fortification remains friendly to the side to which it belongs at the start of the game unless and until captured by the opposing side. At that point, it becomes friendly to the opposing side and its garrison is replaced by a garrison of the opposing side. See Rule 16.13.



A new depot can be established only on a friendly city; friendly permanent fortification (if on a railroad or, for the Union only, if on a coastal hex); or, again for the Union

only, a sea-borne landing hex [see Rule 16.4]. If a depot is established upon a captured city, the city remains "captured" and "friendly" to the side to which the depot belongs even if the depot is no longer accompanied by a field army or garrison.

A new depot must be linked to a friendly PSS. This can either be:

- a) directly by railroad (including railroad crossing points);
- b) directly by navigable river (Union only);
- c) indirectly via a chain comprising one (1+) or more other depot(s); or,
- d) indirectly via a port city (Union only).

In the case of (a) none of the intervening hexes between the PSS and new depot through which the railroad runs can contain a city friendly to the enemy, enemy field army or enemy permanent fortification.

In the case of (b) (applies to Pittsburgh only) the supplies are deemed to travel along the river hex-sides until they reach the new depot. They cannot enter or leave the side of a hex containing a city friendly to the enemy, enemy field army or enemy permanent fortification. Hexes adjacent to rivers within Kentucky are ignored until that state sides with the Union. [See Special Rule 19.1.]

In the case of (c) "other depot(s)" include that/ those which have just been created during the current turn other than by virtue of case (d). There can be no more than three (3) intervening hexes between any two (2) depots in the chain*. None of the intervening hexes can:

- contain a city friendly to the enemy, enemy field army or enemy permanent fortification;

- be adjacent to an enemy field army (unless separated by a navigable river without a bridge or crossing point, or occupied by a friendly field army);
- be separated from the “previous” or “next” hex in the chain by a river (navigable or non-navigable) unless the river is traversed by a railroad bridge or crossing point;
- contain only sea.

* Each hex of difficult terrain counts as two (2) for this rule.

In the case of (d) at least one (1) of Baltimore, New York or Philadelphia must be friendly to the Union. The new depot on the sea borne landing hex is established during the MOVEMENT AND COMBAT phase. See Rules 16.3 and 16.4.

Note: for Rule 14.2 the link to a friendly PSS is necessary only to establish a new depot. Once established the link is no longer required to maintain the depot. See Rule 14.3 for the consequences if the link is broken.

14.3 The Cost of Depots.

Each depot in play, whether established during the current or a previous turn, costs the owning player half of one (0.5) RP, or one (1) RP if it is no longer linked to a friendly PSS. If the aggregate cost in RPs for depots includes a fraction it is rounded up: so, for instance, 2.5 RPs becomes 3 RPs. This cost is deducted from the TRPs still available for the current turn after expenditure upon redoubts. [Exception: the cost for establishing and maintaining a depot on a sea borne landing hex is one (1) RP per Turn. See Rule 16.3]

14.4 Removing Depots.

A player has the option to remove at most one (1) existing friendly depot during the alternating DEPOTS ACTION sequence described at Rule 14.1.

If, after having removed a depot, a player still has insufficient TRPs to fund his existing depots, his opponent chooses which further depot(s) to remove to meet the shortfall.

15.0 CHECK SUPPLY STATUS.

Next, players check the supply status of their field armies. To be in supply a field army must be separated by no more than three (3) intervening hexes from a friendly PSS or depot, two (2) during winter months. The restrictions regarding intervening hexes at Rule 14.2(c), bps 1-4, apply.


Each combat unit in a field army which is not in supply suffers one (1) hit [Rule 16.10]: full-strength units become weakened, weakened units are eliminated. Players apply these results at this stage in the turn simultaneously and immediately update their **Field Army Boxes** per Rule 5.0 to reflect casualties brought about by a lack of supplies.

Commanders and garrisons are unaffected by the Supply Rules. However, if all of the combat units in

a field army are eliminated through lack of supply, follow the procedure at Rule 16.12 for the accompanying commander(s), except that no roll of a d6 is required as the commander cannot be eliminated.

Establishing new depots (Rule 14.2)

Note: for the purposes of the following example the map extract is treated as if it were the entire map; that is, the location of cities, depots, railroads and field armies outside the extract are ignored.



1. During DEPOT ACTIONS phase the Union player establishes a depot in Washington. He/she is able to do this because the city is within the Union and has not been captured (see definition of Friendly City) and it is connected by railroad to the Union’s PSS at Pittsburgh and Philadelphia (Rule 14.2 case (a)). This action costs half of one (0.5) Resource Point.

Note: Washington is separated from Pittsburgh and Philadelphia by no more than three (3) intervening hexes so the depot could also have been established by virtue of Rule 14.2 case (c).

2. Charleston is occupied by Union garrison, so it is friendly to Union (see definition of Friendly City). During DEPOT ACTIONS phase the Union player establishes a depot there. He/she is able to do this because the city is connected to Pittsburgh by the navigable River Ohio (Rule 14.2 case (b)). This action costs half of one (0.5) Resource Point.

Note: Charleston is separated from Pittsburgh by no more than three (3) hexes so the depot could also have been established by virtue of Rule 14.2 case (c).

3. Lynchburg is occupied by Union Field Army “A”, so the city is friendly to the Union (see definition of Friendly City). During DEPOT ACTIONS phase a new depot can be established there because, having established a depot at Charleston, Lynchburg is now linked to the Union’s PSS by a chain of other depots separated by no more than three (3) intervening hexes – Rule 14.2 case (c). (It is deemed to be separated from Charleston by two (2) intervening hexes because hex X counts as two (2) as it comprises difficult terrain.) This action costs half of one (0.5) Resource Point.

Note: Confederate Field Armies “E” and “F” sever the link between Lynchburg and Washington.

4. Union Field Army “B” consists of two (2) weakened infantry units and one (1) full-strength cavalry unit. During MOVEMENT AND COMBAT phase the Union player decides to move this army by sea. It begins its move on a friendly port hex (Baltimore) and disembarks on a vacant coastal hex (Rule 16.4), hex Y. A new depot is established there (Rule 14.2 case (d) and 16.4). These actions cost four (4) Resource Points: three (3) to move the army by sea and one (1) to establish the depot.

Checking supply status (Rule 15.0)
Note: for the purposes of the following example the map extract is treated as if it were the entire map; that is, the location of cities, depots, railroads and field armies outside the extract are ignored.

It is a Summer Turn so to be in supply field armies can be separated by no more than three (3) intervening hexes from a friendly PSS or depot [Rule 15.0]. The Confederates have established a depot on Decatur. This means:

- Confederate Field Army "A" is in supply. Supply routes for field armies cannot cross rivers, other than via railroad bridges or crossing points, nor can they enter hexes immediately adjacent to enemy field armies (Rule 14.2 (c), bps 2 and 3). So, the direct route, north through hex X is not possible. However, there exists another route: via Corinth and then following the River Tennessee northwards for two (2) hexes, before crossing the river at the railroad bridge. Although circuitous, taking this route there are only three (3) intervening hexes between Field Army "A" and the depot.
- Confederate Field Army "B" is also in supply. Again, the proximity of Union Field Army "H" blocks the direct route (marked by a dotted line) via hex Y. However, there exists another route, slightly to the south of the direct route. This is marked by a solid arrow on the diagram. (Note: hex Z counts as two (2) because it comprises difficult terrain (Rule 14.2 (c))).
Note: had the River Tennessee been a navigable river Union Field Army "H" would not have blocked the direct route as Rule 14.2(c), bp. 2 would apply.
- Confederate Field Army "C" is out of supply. Although there are only three (3) intervening hexes between Decatur and the field army there is no bridge or crossing point linking Memphis to Field Army "C". So, for the purposes of checking supply the number of intervening hexes is greater than three (>3). See Rule 14.2 (c) bp. 3.

As a consequence of being out of supply, each combat unit in Confederate Field Army "C" suffers one (1) "hit" [Rule 16.10]: full-strength units become weakened, weakened units are eliminated. The Confederate player would update its Field Army Box as follows to reflect casualties brought about by a lack of supplies (Rule 5.0).

Confederate Field Army "C"	Confederate Field Army "C"								
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">2 ⊗ b</td> <td style="text-align: center;">4 ⊗ c</td> <td rowspan="2" style="text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;">Commanders</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">1 ⊗ e</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	2 ⊗ b	4 ⊗ c	Commanders	1 ⊗ e		<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">2 ⊗ b</td> <td style="text-align: center;">4 ⊗ c</td> <td style="text-align: center; vertical-align: middle;">Commanders</td> </tr> </table>	2 ⊗ b	4 ⊗ c	Commanders
2 ⊗ b	4 ⊗ c	Commanders							
1 ⊗ e									
2 ⊗ b	4 ⊗ c	Commanders							

16.0 MOVEMENT AND COMBAT.

16.1 Overview.



Firstly, players alternate allocating an Activation Marker to one (1) hex containing **either** a field army (including its commanders) that they wish to move **or** a commander(s) in that hex that they wish to move independently to join another field army(ies). As each Activation Marker is allocated its cost in terms of RPs [see Rule 16.3] is deducted from the TRPs still available for the current turn after expenditure upon redoubts and depots. If at any time a player declines to allocate an Activation Marker, he does not get further opportunity to do so during the current turn. His opponent, however, may continue to allocate Activation Markers until he, too, is unwilling or unable to do so.

The Union player is the first to allocate a Marker. Once both players have finished allocating Activation Markers, the second part of the Phase begins: the Movement Process. Players alternate moving the field armies and commanders on hexes to which Markers have been allocated.

Note: if a player has deployed an Activation Marker(s), but declines to move a field army or commander when it is his turn to do so, all the Activation Markers which he has yet to action are removed from play. His opponent may continue moving combat units and commanders as normal.

Movement is by railroad, navigable river (Union only), sea (Union only) or by foot.

If a field army moving by foot attempts to enter a hex occupied by an enemy field army or garrison combat occurs [see Rules 16.6 and 16.7 for exceptions and restrictions]. **The combat is resolved before the alternating movement procedure recommences.**

16.2 Movement Process.

Players alternate issuing an order in respect of each Activation Marker. This can be **either** for one (1) field army (including its commanders) to move; **or** for any number of commanders to leave the field army and join another field army(ies), subject to at least one (1) commander remaining with the first field army per Rule 6.0.

The sequence is started by the player who has allocated the most markers or by the Union player if both players have allocated the same number. After each move, the relevant Activation Marker is removed from the game map.

During this process a field army (or commander) can only be ordered to **move once**, excluding any move because of combat [Rule 16.11.b or 16.11.c]. However, subject to the availability of field army sleighs, a field army may be split and a new one created with some units remaining in situ whilst others moving to-

gether as a new field army; or, if two (2+) or more Activation Markers have been allocated to a field army, part may remain in situ, part may become a new field army moving to "this" destination, and part may become another new field army moving to "that" destination.

Note: because a field army or combat unit can only move once, if a field army [X] merges with [Y] which subsequently moves, the combat units from [X] will have to remain in situ and a new field army [Z] created to accommodate them.

If a field army ends its move on a hex already occupied by a friendly field army, the two (2) field armies merge and one (1) of the field army sleighs is removed from the game map ready to be re-used if and when a new field army is created. If the aggregate units in the merged field army exceed twelve (12) [Rule 3.0] excess units are eliminated (owning player's choice).

Similarly, unless moving by railroad or navigable river, if a moving field army moves through a hex containing a friendly field army and the aggregate units in the two (2) field armies exceed twelve (12), excess units are eliminated (owning player's choice).

Moving through a friendly field army "X" on a "pre-attack hex" to attempt to enter an adjacent "combat hex" is permitted [see Rule 16.6]. If Rule 16.11.a applies, or if the moving field army declines the option to occupy the combat hex [see Rule 16.11.b], the two (2) friendly field armies must merge on the "pre-attack hex" occupied by "X".

Note: an Activation Marker which has "yet to be used" can never "accompany" a moving field army, unless the move was a result of combat [Rules 16.11.b or 16.11.c].

Note: if a commander moving independently of a field army was an army commander, or becomes an army commander, his commander counter should be removed from or inserted in the sleigh of the field army which he leaves or joins. Otherwise the only change will be to the commander counters in the Field Army Box of the transferor and transferee armies.

- REMEMBER
- 1) The Confederates can never have more than eight (8) and the Union never more than ten (10) field armies in play;
- 2) No more than one (1) field army can ever occupy a given hex;
- 3) A field army or hex can never accommodate more than twelve (12) friendly combat units;
- 4) Each combat unit is always part of a field army and can only move as such;
- 5) Each group of combat units activated to move must remain together as a field army throughout their move;
- 6) All changes of field army composition/strength need to be recorded immediately on the appropriate Field Army Box;
- 7) A field army must always be accompanied by a command unit(s). A command unit(s) leaving a field army and moving separately must always end its move attached to another field army;
- 8) A field army (or combat unit or command unit) can move only once during this phase, excluding any move because of combat [Rule 16.11.b or 16.11.c].

16.3 Movement Costs.

The basic cost of allocating an Activation Marker to a hex is half of one (0.5) RP, unless the hex is out of supply per Rule 15.0 in which case the cost is one (1) RP. If the aggregate cost in RPs for Activation Markers includes a fraction it is rounded up: so, for instance, 2.5 RPs becomes 3 RPs.

There are no further costs associated with moving a commander(s) independently of a field army. There is no limit to the number of hexes a commander can move.

The further cost of moving a field army (including commanders) by friendly railroad (including railroad crossing points) or by navigable river is one (1) RP for the entire journey.

The further cost of moving a field army (including commanders) by sea is three (3) RPs, or four (4) if a new depot is established on the landing hex [see Rules 14.2(d) and 16.4].

The further cost of moving a field army (including commanders) other than by friendly railroad or navigable river or by sea (that is, on foot) is one (1) RP per hex, or two (2) if the hex comprises "difficult terrain" [Rule 2.0]. In winter months all hexes cost two (2) RPs to enter. Crossing a non-navigable river other than via a railroad bridge or crossing point costs a further one (1) RP. (Navigable rivers can only be traversed via railroad bridges or crossing points.)

16.4 Movement Restrictions.

General.

A commander moving independently of a field army must end its move on another field army. A commander cannot leave a field army unless another commander(s) remains with the army [Rule 6.0].

A field army (or combat unit or command unit) can move only once during this phase, excluding any move because of combat [Rule 16.11.b or 16.11.c].

A field army must move entirely by railroad, or entirely by navigable river, or entirely by sea, or entirely on foot.

A field army is permitted to pass through a friendly permanent fortification, but may not end its move there.

Subject to these general restrictions, the specific restrictions set out below and the cost of moving [Rule 16.3] there is no limit upon the number of hexes which a field army can move.

Movement by railroad or navigable river.

Each turn, a maximum of eight (8) Union and five (5) Confederate combat units in a maximum of two (2) and one (1) field armies, respectively, can move by friendly railroad; and, a maximum of four (4) Union combat units in one (1) field army can move by navigable river.

A field army travelling by friendly railroad (including railroad crossing points) must begin and end its move in friendly cities connected by the railroad. Both cities must be in supply per Rule 15.0. The moving field army must not enter or leave a hex adjacent to an enemy field army or containing an enemy permanent fortification or city friendly to the enemy.

Note: if Columbia, Memphis or Vicksburg is friendly, subject to the other restrictions which apply to movement by railroad, a moving field army may continue its journey "beyond" the city and along the railroad spur which ends in the countryside.

A field army moving by navigable river must begin and end its move in friendly cities connected by the river. Both cities must be in supply per Rule 15.0. The army is deemed to travel **along the river hex-sides** between its starting and destination city. It cannot enter or leave the side of a hex containing an enemy field army, or permanent fortification, or city friendly to the enemy. Hexes adjacent to rivers within Kentucky are ignored until that state joins the Union. [See Special Rule 19.1.]

Movement by sea.

Each turn the Union player (only) may order a field army comprising no more than three (3) combat units (and any number of commanders) to which an Activation Marker has been allocated to move by sea. The army must begin the move on a friendly port hex and end on a coastal hex not containing a Confederate field army, or permanent fortification or garrison. The units can move no further during "this" turn. If the landing units are not already in supply, a depot is placed on the landing hex. [See Rules 14.2(d) and 16.3.]

Movement on foot.

A field army moving on foot cannot:

- Enter a sea hex, or traverse a navigable river other than via a railroad bridge or crossing point [see Optional Rule 20.2].
- Move **directly** from a hex adjacent to an enemy field army to another such hex **unless** the second hex is a "combat hex" [see Rule 16.6] or separated by a navigable river without a bridge or crossing point.
- Enter a hex which is out of supply per Rule 15.0, although it may "attempt" to enter such a hex in order to instigate combat **provided** that it only exercises any option to advance into that hex if it is able to do so whilst remaining in supply [see Rule 16.11.b].
- Move if it is on a hex which is out of supply **unless** its destination hex is in supply per Rule 15.0. A field army which begins its move **out of supply cannot instigate combat** by attempting to enter a "combat hex" during its move.
- End its move on a permanent fortification; (but, it is permitted to pass through a friendly permanent fortification).

16.5 Depots and Garrisons.

A friendly field army can enter and/or pass through a city hex occupied by friendly depot or garrison at no additional cost in terms of RPs.

A friendly field army moving by foot can enter and/or pass through a city hex occupied by an enemy depot or garrison, unaccompanied by an enemy field army, at no additional cost in terms of RPs. The enemy depot or garrison is removed from play.

16.6 Combat.

Provided it has sufficient RPs available to do so, a field army **moving on foot** may **attempt** to enter a hex containing an enemy field army. Combat then occurs on that hex (the "combat hex"). The adjacent hex from which the attacking field army attempts to enter the combat hex is the "pre-attack hex". The combat ends the move of the moving field army (other than any move as an outcome of combat [Rule 16.11.b or 16.11.c]).

See Rule 16.13 for attacks upon permanent fortifications.

The combat is resolved as follows **before** the alternating movement procedure re-commences.

16.7 Combat Restrictions.

A unit can be ordered to attack only once per turn (being called upon to participate in a coordinated attack [Rule 16.8], irrespective of whether this takes place, counts as having been ordered to attack). [Exception: Rule 16.11.c]

Attacks cannot be made across navigable rivers other than at river crossings or railroad bridges.

Artillery units cannot engage in combat as attackers unless accompanied by a friendly cavalry or infantry unit(s).

16.8 Coordinated Attacks.

From Spring 1863 (Turn 9) the attacking player has the option to attempt to mount a coordinated attack by calling upon support from a second field army (**one (1) only**) adjacent to the defending field army. The second field army cannot be separated from the defending field army by a river, unless connected by a railroad bridge or crossing point.

If the attacking player wishes to exercise this option, **before** undertaking the attack he rolls 1d6.

If the result is **five (5) or six (6)** the second field army provides support by adding one (1) for each of its combat units to the Adjusted Combat Value [ACV] of the attacking field army [see Rule 16.9].

If the die result is **three (3) or four (4)**, the second field army does not provide support and the attack is carried out by the attacking field army only.

If it is **one (1) or two (2)** the entire attack is aborted and does not proceed.

Note: after rolling a five (5) or six (6) the attacking player reveals the aggregate number of combat units

in the second field army, but gives no other details as to its composition.

16.9 Combat Calculations.

Only combat units within an attacking or defending field army which are under the direct or indirect control of an army commander [Rule 6.0] may take part in a combat. If he is a senior commander he is able to control directly the number of combat units specified by his CR and, indirectly, the number of combat units specified on the counters for the junior commander(s) he is able to command. (If two (2+) or more senior commanders are present, only the army commander is relevant for this computation; the other(s) cannot participate in the combat.)

If the army commander is a junior commander, the number of combat units which may participate is limited to the CR of the junior commander.

Note: The number of units under the direct control of the army commander must participate in a combat. However, players have the discretion to withhold other commanders (and thus the units they are able to command) from the Army Battlefield; and, as illustrated by the following example, some commanders may be precluded from participating.

Example: An attacking Confederate field army comprises 2xArt (1 weakened), 2xCav and 4xInf (3 weakened). It is accompanied by two (2) senior commanders each with a CR of 2 and a SCR of 1, and two (2) junior commanders, each with a CR of 2. Only the senior commander whose counter is inserted in the sleigh (ie, the army commander) can participate in the combat, together with the one (1) junior commander he is able to command. The army commander can control two (2) combat units directly and two (2) indirectly via the junior commander. So, the attacking player must select 2 and may select 4 of his 8 units to participate. (Neither the "second" senior commander nor "second" junior commander are able to participate.)


The defending field army comprises 1xArt, 4xCav and 4xInf. It is accompanied by two (2) junior commanders, first with a CR of 3 and second with a CR of 2. As army commander, the former's counter is inserted in the sleigh. A junior commander cannot command a fellow junior, so the "second" junior cannot participate. The defending player selects only 3 of his 9 units to participate in the combat.

Having selected their units, each player places a Field Army Detail Marker for each participating unit-type, rotated so that the number of participating units is at the top, together with counters for each commander selected to take part, on his Army Battlefield printed adjacent to the game map. Players then move their Fog of War screens from the green line to the red line to reveal the units deployed on their Army Battlefield.

Players should not reveal details of units or com-

manders not participating in the combat.

To continue the previous example, if the Confederate player selected 1xArt, 1xCav and 1xInf at full-strength and 1xInf (weakened) his Army Battlefield would look like this:



Each player then rolls 2d6, one (1) blue (positive) and one (1) grey (negative).

If the positive number is higher, the player may add an additional combat unit (+1) to those participating (assuming an additional unit is available).

If the negative number is higher his opponent may remove one (-1) of the units selected to participate in the combat (unless only one (1) unit has been selected).

If the numbers are equal there is no effect.

Next players calculate the aggregate Basic Combat Value [BCV] of the participating units in each field army. This is achieved by adding together the individual Combat Value [CVs] of the **participating units (only)**. Each combat unit has a CV of **two (2) if at full-strength**, or **one (1) if weakened**.

The BCV of the **participating units (only)** in each field army is adjusted as follows:

- The BCV of participating **attackers** and/or **defenders** is increased by two (2) for **each additional** friendly field army adjacent to the defending field army (including any attacking field army called upon to participate in a co-ordinated attack per Rule 16.8), **unless** the additional army is separated by a river without a railroad bridge or crossing point.
- The BCV of participating **defenders** is increased by four (4) if they occupy difficult terrain or a redoubt; and/or, if they are separated from the attacking field army by a non-navigable river (whether or not connected by railroad bridge or crossing point) or by the railroad bridge or crossing point of a navigable river.
- The BCV of participating **attackers** and/or **defenders** is increased by two (2) if the units comprise infantry **and** cavalry **or** artillery and by four (4) if the units comprise infantry **and both** cavalry and artillery.
- The BCV of participating **attackers** and/or **defenders** is adjusted to reflect any REC(s) played at the start of the turn.
- The BCV of participating **attackers** is increased by one (1) for each of the combat units in any supporting field army involved in a coordinated attack [Rule 16.8].

These adjustments give an Adjusted Combat Value [ACV] for the participating units in the attacking field army and for the defending field army.

Each player rolls 1d6 and adds the result to the ACV

for his field army to give the Final Combat Value [FCV].

The field army with the higher FCV is the winner of the combat, the other field army is the loser.

16.10 Combat Hits.

The Extended Example of Play includes examples of the rules and restrictions described in the following paragraphs.

The difference between the winning and losing FCVs equates to the maximum number of "hits" which the winning field army can inflict upon **participating** combat units (only) of the losing field army. This maximum is restricted to the number of combat units **participating** in the winning field army when combat commenced, and by the capacity of the losing field army to absorb hits, to arrive at the number of hits which it actually inflicts. **Combat units which did not participate or were not on the combat or pre-attack hex are ignored when calculating this possible restriction.**

Half the number of "hits" which the winning field army actually inflicts, fractions rounded down, is the maximum number of hits which the **participating** units in the losing field army can inflict upon **participating** combat units in the winning field army. [Exception: Rule 16.11.c]. Again, this maximum is restricted to the number of participating combat units in the losing field army when combat commenced. **Combat units which did not participate or were not on the combat or pre-attack hex are ignored when calculating this possible restriction.**

The owning player selects to which of his combat units "hits" are allocated. If a hit is allocated to a full-strength combat unit, it becomes weakened. If two (2) hits are allocated to a full-strength unit, or one (1) hit to an already weakened unit, the unit is eliminated.

Hits are applied immediately. All hits must be applied if possible. If, however, all the units on one (or both) sides which **participated** in the combat are eliminated, surplus hits are discarded. (Hits cannot be allocated to non-participating units or to units in adjacent hexes.)

Remember to update the Field Army Boxes to reflect the "hits" received per Rule 5.0.

Hits are not applied to commanders [see Rule 16.12].

16.11 Combat Outcomes.

Unlike combat "hits" which are applied only to participating combat units, combat outcomes apply to all units within a field army.

a) If the difference between the winning FCV and losing FCV is **three (3) or less**, the defending field army remains in the combat hex, and the attacking field army remains in the pre-attack hex.

b) If it is **four (4), five (5), six (6) or seven (7)**

the losing field army retreats **two (2) passable hexes** (irrespective of terrain) from the combat hex in the case of the defender, or from the pre-attack hex if the attacker was the loser. Losing artillery units cannot retreat and are eliminated.

The **losing player** selects the route and destination hex for his retreating field army. None of the hexes can comprise impassable terrain; or contain or be adjacent to an enemy field army or garrison; or involve crossing a river (other than via a railroad bridge or crossing point). If no such route exists all the units in the field army are eliminated and the field army sleigh is removed from the game map ready to be re-used when a new field army is created.

A retreating field army cannot be split. "Excess" combat units in a field army obliged to retreat through a friendly field army in contravention of the **limit of twelve (12)** combat units [Rule 3.0] are eliminated (owning player's choice). If a field army retreats on a hex already occupied by a friendly field army, again any "excess" units are eliminated (owning player's choice), the two (2) field armies merge, and one (1) of the field army sleighs is removed from the game map ready to be re-used if and when a new field army is created.

After the losing field army has retreated per the previous paragraph, the victorious field army has the option to advance to occupy the newly vacated hex. Subject to an available field army sleigh, the advancing army may be split into two (2) so that one (1) field army advances and one (1) remains in situ. (Leaving a field army in situ may be necessary to enable a newly created second field army to advance after combat whilst remaining in supply, see Rule 16.4, Movement on foot, bp. 3.)

c) If it is **eight or more (8+)**, b) above, applies except that the **winning player** selects the route and destination hex of the retreating field army. A route which results in the fewest possible defeated units being eliminated must be selected. In addition, **no hits are allocated to participating units in the victorious field army**; and, if it, or part of it, **exercises** the option to advance into the vacated hex it may mount another attack **immediately** (that is, before the alternating movement procedure re-commences) if there is an enemy field army or permanent fortification on an adjacent hex.

16.12 Commanders.

If all of the combat units in a field army are eliminated during combat, the owning player rolls 1d6 for each commander. A score of one (1) means the commander is killed and removed permanently from play. Otherwise, the commander is removed temporarily from play: his counter remains off the board until the REINFORCEMENTS AND GARRISONS phase of the next following turn.

A Union commander then re-enters play by joining

the Union field army nearest to **Washington** (owning player's choice if two (2+) or more armies are equidistant).

A Confederate commander joins the Confederate field army nearest to **Richmond** (owning player's choice if two (2+) or more armies are equidistant).

16.13 Permanent Fortifications.

A permanent fortification has an ACV of ten (10). It may be attacked by an enemy field army moving on foot with sufficient RPs to enter the fortification. The field army's ACV is calculated per Rule 16.9. Each player then rolls 1d6 and adds the result to the ACV to arrive at the FCV for the permanent fortification and field army.

If the permanent fortification has the higher FCV, or the field army has the higher FCV and Rule 16.11.a applies, the garrison remains in situ and two (2) hits are suffered by units in the field army (owner's choice, but with priority being given to infantry units).

If Rule 16.11.b or 16.11.c applies the fortification is captured. Its garrison is eliminated and replaced with a garrison counter friendly to the field army. The friendly field army remains in situ (does not enter the fortification), and suffers one (1) hit to an infantry unit (to represent the creation of a new garrison).

17.0 COMBAT EXPERIENCE.

For 1862, 1863 and 1864 each Spring Turn after the MOVEMENT AND COMBAT phase each player may upgrade twelve (12) weakened combat units to full-strength (owning player's choice). For each unit this involves increasing the number of full-strength units in the appropriate Field Army Box by one (+1) and reducing the weakened number by one (-1).

Each player may also upgrade to level two (2) two (2) level one (1) junior commanders and one (1) level one (1) senior commander counter.

Note: not all commanders have a level 2 rating.

Remember to check whether any newly upgraded commander has become an army commander and should be placed in the sleigh for the field army which he now commands [see Rule 6.0].

18.0 REINFORCEMENTS AND GARRISONS.

18.1 The arrival of reinforcements each turn is specified on each player's Turn Track printed adjacent to the game map.

Confederate reinforcements join any friendly field army(ies) in the Confederate States in supply per Rule 15.0 (owning player's choice).

Union reinforcements join any friendly field army(ies) in the United States in supply per Rule 15.0 (owning player's choice).

All reinforcements **arrive "weakened"** reflecting their lack of experience and training.

Remember to update the Field Army Boxes of the receiving armies per Rule 5.0.



18.2 Finally, each player has the option to place a garrison counter on any enemy city(ies) occupied by a friendly field army.

The friendly field army suffers one (1) hit to an infantry unit (to represent the creation of a new garrison). Once placed, a garrison counter cannot move and remains in situ unless and until the city is captured by an enemy field army at which point it is removed from play.

Remember to update the Field Army Boxes to reflect the creation of garrisons per Rule 5.0.

19.0 SPECIAL RULES.

19.1 Kentucky.

At the very beginning of each turn, until either (a) and/or (b) applies, the Union player rolls 1d6. Union units or supply routes cannot enter Kentucky until the first of:

- the 1d6 score being equal to or less than the turn number or
- a Confederate field army entering the state.

At that point, Kentucky sides with the Union and the cities and railroads therein become "friendly" to the Union.

19.2 General Robert E. Lee.

General Lee is usually considered the outstanding general of the War. To reflect this, he begins as a level 2 senior commander and retains this rating throughout the game. General Lee cannot be deployed or move more than **five (5) hexes** from Richmond.

20.0 OPTIONAL RULES.

20.1 European powers actively support Confederacy.

If three (3) Union cities are occupied by Confederate field armies, garrisons, and/or depots, for the remainder of the game (or until REC 24 is played) the Union player may not supply by sea any depots on sea borne landing hexes [Rule 14.2] or move units by sea [Rule 16.4]; and, the Union's TRPs are reduced by one (1) per turn. Beginning on Turn 6, the three (3) cities may include those in Kentucky.

20.2 Control of navigable rivers by Union riverine units.

When a Confederate field army attempts to cross a navigable river via a river crossing (whether on foot or by railroad) the Union player rolls 1d6. A roll of five (5) or six (6) prevents the crossing, and brings to an end the field army's move on the hex from which it attempted to cross if on foot, or the last friendly city it passed through, if travelling by railroad.

Credits.

Designer: Stephen Pole

Map, cards and counters: Stephen Pole, Adam Niechwiej and Krzysztof Korzeniak

Cover: Krzysztof Korzeniak

Play testers: Rollo, Ruben, Lois, Wookey and the Westlake Crew

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Designer Notes.**Background.**

When, on 12 April 1861, the South Carolina militia opened fire upon Federal soldiers manning a half-finished fort in Charleston Harbor, the first modern war began; or, perhaps more accurately, the first war of the industrial age began. Within months, the smouldering animosity between Northern and Southern states, sparked into flame by the attack on Fort Sumter, had taken on many of the trappings associated with conflicts between industrial powers in the coming century: large-scale manufacture of material, rapid movement of troops by railroad, lethal weapons able to scythe down enemies at long range, deep and sophisticated defensive positions, and a growing disenchantment manifested by the need for conscription and a resigned acceptance of suffering replacing initial naivety and enthusiasm for the war.

The new style of warfare relied upon economic strength: industry capable of producing munitions and the means to transport them, and a population able and willing to provide the manpower to fight. Looking at the two sides in this context, there could only be one winner: the North had a population of 22.0 million compared to 8.5 million Southerners (including 3.5 million slaves), and was home to nearly 90% of North America's industrial base which was more than capable, once put on a war footing, of keeping its armies fully supplied. It also had viable blue water navy, which succeeded in blockading the Confederacy, and was able to massively out-produce the South in terms of gunboats to control navigable rivers like the Mississippi. In contrast, the Southern economy was dependent almost entirely upon agriculture. This, in turn, resulted in a reliance upon the import of manufactured goods (despite the existence of extensive coal and iron ore deposits) and a railroad network geared towards facilitating the movement of cotton and tobacco. Although the South did have a significant industrial capacity, including factories which were central to the war effort, such as the Tredegar Iron Works in Virginia and the Augusta Powder Works in Georgia, the Northern blockade restricted the supply of raw materials necessary for them to operate at full capacity and a relatively poor rail network hampered the distribution of finished products. The transportation network in the South was so disjointed that by the end of the war there were food surpluses in some areas and malnutrition in others.

And yet, and yet ... the war lasted for five years and on more than one occasion a Confederate victory, or at least honourable draw, appeared to be on the cards. It seemed to me that trying to understand the reasons for this apparent contradiction was fundamental to designing a game about the American Civil War: in short, why did the South do so well? Looked at from a strategic point of view, it could be argued that the Confederacy had some important advantages. The South didn't have to land a knock-out blow, merely demonstrate that it could and would defend its own territory with such tenacity that the cost in lives of attempting to invade it would be politically unacceptable in the North. On occasion, this strategy nearly worked: the North had a significant anti-War movement ("Copperheads") whose influence waxed and waned depending upon the fortunes of war. Even as late as 1864, had the North not secured significant military successes in Georgia during the run up to the presidential election, most notably the burning of Atlanta, it is possible that Lincoln would have lost to his Democratic rival (McClellan) who may well have entertained terms for peace.

The problem with such a defensive strategy was that if political opinion in the North didn't shift and remained opposed to the Confederacy breaking away, the South would eventually find itself in a war of attrition which, for the reasons set out above, it could not hope to win. This, of course, is what eventually happened; but, again, it was not inevitable. Mindful of this danger, the Confederacy made several attempts to seize the strategic initiative in the hope of securing an acceptable peace: Jackson's Valley Campaign (1862); Lee's advance into Maryland (1862); Bragg's invasion of Kentucky (1862); Lee's march into Pennsylvania (1863); and, Hood's invasion of Tennessee (1864). None could be categorised as a stunning strategic success; although in the short-term they did relieve pressure on the Confederacy by tying up Northern troops which could otherwise have been used for offensive operations; and, these forays into the North or Union occupied territory, combined with the South's overriding defensive strategy served to prolong the war.

The North had a strategy, too, of course. Indeed, the Commander-in Chief at the time that the war broke out, Winfield Scott, devised what became known as the "Anaconda Plan"; essentially, using a combination of army and naval forces to blockade the South and let economic deprivation slowly force it into submission. This is very close to what actually happened; but, in 1861 Scott's plan was disregarded, and Scott himself derided as senile. All the talk was about invading the South and securing a quick and glorious victory over the "rebels". Any prospect of a quick victory was soon dispelled by the bloody, but strategically inconclusive battles of 1861 and 1862 in the vicinity of the two capitals, Richmond and Washington: the two Battles of Bull Run, Seven Days Battle, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. Meanwhile, in the less glamorous, but arguably more significant strategically, Mississippi theatre of operations the North was able to make some tangible progress, for a while at least. Grant's capture of Forts Henry and Donelson (1861), following a combined army and riverine attack, facilitated an advance by Union forces deep into Tennessee culminating in a victory snatched from the jaws of defeat at Shiloh (1862). Confederate fortresses along the Mississippi as far south as Memphis fell to the North, which also seized the lower reaches of the river when the Union Navy, led by Farragut, captured New Orleans. The most important city between Memphis and New Orleans was Vicksburg; and, it was here that the Union offensive stalled, becoming a stalemate akin to the situation in the east. The North had to accept that the war could not be won quickly, and de facto was obliged to adopt something akin to Scott's "Anaconda Plan".

In the opening years of the war the nature of the two armies and their weapons also mitigated against rapid military success. One of the most striking features of the war is the similarity between both sides in most battles in terms of casualties suffered. Truly decisive victories were few and far between. In part this was because, initially, for the most part this was a war fought between amateurs: few men called to arms had much if any military experience or training and the armies lacked the discipline or cohesion to undertake sophisticated manoeuvres. Nor was the logistical support sufficiently well organised to sustain an energetic advance. In part, too, it was because the tactical dogma to which many

commanders adhered had fallen behind technical developments in weaponry. In particular, the rifled musket which had been introduced in the 1850s had an effective range of 350 yards about three times that of the muskets used during the War of 1812 or the American-Mexican War (1846-48). Unfortunately, the consequences of this were not appreciated for some time, and armies continued to attack in massed ranks with the predictable result that many battles were orgies of slaughter with terrible losses on both sides. The advantage that the new weaponry already gave to defenders, in particular, was gradually enhanced as soldiers learned to make better use of cover and became more adept at digging lines of trenches. Artillery, too, tended to benefit defenders, especially when attackers resorted to frontal assaults such as Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg (1863). To all intents and purposes, the developments in weaponry made cavalry redundant on the battlefield. It retained crucial roles, however, in terms of raiding enemy communications and supply lines, and reconnaissance. Whilst the former held out the prospect of glory, particularly attractive to the swashbuckling Southern cavalry, the latter was often more important. No-where is his better illustrated than during the Gettysburg Campaign (1863) when the absence of Stuart's cavalry, raiding behind Union lines, deprived the main Confederate army under Lee of any intelligence as to the composition or location of Northern forces for over a week. The final factor which, initially, tended to favour the defender was the quality of leadership. Like the men whom they commanded, with a few notable exceptions (Lee being the most obvious) most of those appointed to high command had neither the innate talent nor military education necessary for the role to which they were appointed. Many gradually learned their new trade from experience, the most exacting of teachers, to become competent or better. Others hardly learned at all. The problem was exacerbated by the need to appoint generals for political considerations: certain states and factions had to be represented in order to maintain their support for the war. Banks, for example, a millworker from Massachusetts, was given a commission in the Union Army to keep on side those who were determined that slavery should be abolished in the Confederacy (the "Abolitionists"). Unsurprisingly, he began his military career by leading his men to a series of inglorious defeats fighting in the Shenandoah Valley (1862) against Stonewall Jackson, one of the South's most talented generals.

Having considered how and why the South was able to keep the economically superior North at bay for so long, the second question to be addressed in designing a game about the war is what changed to bring about the end of the Confederacy? The answer lies in a combination of factors, many of which arose naturally from the opening phase of the war.

At a strategic level, the pressure on the Confederacy brought about by the "Anaconda Plan" which the North found itself having to adopt began to have serious economic consequences for the South. As the North grew stronger so the South became weaker. Throughout the war the number of men under arms in the Union army increased steadily, reaching about a million by March 1865; in contrast, the peak of Confederate strength came in 1863 when its armies contained approximately 450,000 men; thereafter, the numbers declined. After the fall of Vicksburg (July 1863) the Union had complete control of the Mississippi, effectively cutting the Confederacy in half and denying it assistance from its territories in the far west. As pressure from the North mounted, so discontent increased amongst civilians in the South with food riots breaking out in several cities. This disillusionment with the war began to infect its troops as evidenced by an ever growing number of desertions from the army.

Beyond the slow economic strangulation of the South, it also became diplomatically and politically isolated. The Confederacy had hoped for recognition, if not assistance, from European powers; but, any thoughts the British or French had about intervening were tempered by a shortage of corn in Europe (the North was a major exporter of corn) and evaporated altogether when Lincoln issued the "Emancipation Proclamation". From January 1863 "maintaining the Union" was joined by "freedom for slaves" as the *raison d'être* for the war. This had the effect of enhancing the moral justification of the Northern cause, and weakening the Southern war effort which relied heavily upon slave labour. Following the Proclamation, the North was able to recruit maybe as many as 300,000 ex-slaves from the South to serve in its armies, whilst the Confederacy had to tie up precious resources to guard against a possible rising by the slave labour upon which its economy depended.

As the South began to run out of men and material, so Northern commanders were becoming more adept at waging offensive operations, and their armies and logistical support better equipped to do so. Having captured Vicksburg, Grant gradually pushed the Southern forces back into Georgia. His success led to his being transferred to the east to take charge of operations there. He was replaced by Sherman, and equally able general, who won a series of battles before burning Atlanta (September 1864). Sherman then commenced his famous "march to the sea", strategically the most decisive campaign of the entire war. Reaching Savannah in December, having cut a swath of destruction some 50 miles wide across the heart of Georgia, he was halted only by a brutally severe winter. When campaigning recommenced, Sherman marched north into the Carolinas, approaching Richmond from the south, whilst Grant, who was already laying siege to the Southern capital, made preparation for a final assault. It never came. On 9 April 1865 the war ended with the Confederate surrender at Appomattox.

Even though militarily the situation had long been hopeless, the outcome of the war remained in doubt until Lincoln was re-elected as president in November 1864. Had it not been for the Union's military successes during the presidential election campaign, most notably the burning of Atlanta, it is possible that a war-weary Northern electorate would have voted Lincoln out and replaced him with, McCellan, the Democratic candidate who ran on a platform advocating peace with the Confederacy.

This leaves the third and final question: how to reflect within the context of a simple wargame these dramatic events which still impact upon our lives 250 years later?

Gaming the War.

"How the Union was Saved" [*HtUwS*] is played on a conventional hex grid superimposed upon a map of the eastern part of North America. Each hex equates to an area approximately 100 kilometres across, and each game turn represents about three months of actual time.

At this grand strategic scale only the most significant geographical features are reflected on the map: the principal railroads, so important for the movement of men and munitions; the major rivers which also constituted a means of transport (especially for the North), and formed natural lines of defence (especially for the South); the main cities and permanent fortifications. In the game, as in the war itself, these features often determine the location of the most decisive action. Again, from a grand strategic perspective we have seen how the North held substantial advantages in terms of population and industrial capacity. The size of these were such that – given the character of the war (see below) - the South could not hope to inflict losses on the North faster than they could be replaced. In contrast, the South often lacked the capacity to replace their battle losses even when victorious. Clearly this asymmetry was fundamental to the progress and outcome of the war; the question was, how best to model it for the purpose of designing *HtUwS*? We tried various mechanisms, each giving players a greater or lesser amount of control over economic/industrial matters. Generally, our attempts failed in that they made the rules too cumbersome and complicated; but, significantly, we noticed that they each produced a similar range of results. Not only this, but the spectrum was plausible when compared with the historical outcome. Accordingly, during play-testing we took the decision to cut out of the design the process whereby the economic/industrial outcomes were generated by player action; and, instead, simply translate the outcomes themselves into Resource Points [RPs] which govern the amount of activity which players are able to undertake each Turn. Whilst this mechanism usually mirrors the significant advantages enjoyed by the North, to keep players on their toes we included an element of chance so that they are unable to predict with certainty the number of RPs available "next" Turn.

Simple, plausible and interesting. The heart of the game had started to beat.

Looking at the conduct of the war at an operational level, the scale of *HtUwS* is such that it would be unrealistic to introduce factors to represent tactical nuances or subtle differences between unit types. So we opted to reflect what we saw as the key features of combat. Firstly, the way in which the performance of troops and (many) commanders improved as they gained in experience. So, beginning in 1862, a certain number of combat units and commanders can be upgraded each year to make them more effective. Secondly, the fact that in most engagements there was relatively little difference in terms of losses between the winners and losers. This was important because even when the South emerged victorious from open battle they were often unable to replace their losses; a tactical victory might well translate into a strategic defeat, and a tactical defeat could well become a strategic setback. Thirdly, the great advantage afforded to defenders holding natural or man-made defensive positions: hence the combat bonuses given to combat units defending permanent fortifications, redoubts and river lines. Finally, intelligence, or the lack of it, played a key role. Often commanders were uncertain as to the size or composition of the enemy force which confronted them, and/or were deliberately misled by a cunning adversary. We like to think that a combination of the alternating movement mechanic, and the way in which information about friendly field armies is withheld from the opponent, goes some way towards replicating this.

The more we read about the war, the more that the importance of logistical considerations became apparent. These were intrinsic to the planning for all major campaigns. The long distances involved made it practical to supply front-line troops directly from the main source of supply only in areas which were served by railroads and/or navigable rivers. In many ways, these determined where the major engagements took place and resulted in a war divided into two distinct theatres: in the east around Richmond and Washington; and in the west along the Mississippi. Away from the principal transport links supplying armies became more difficult and the belligerents tended to establish chains of "depots". It was essential that the game system recognized the key role of logistics and its influence upon strategy. RPs provided a ready means of doing just this. As their forces advance players need to "spend" RPs in order to create depots to keep armies in supply. The more they spend upon depots the less they have for other purposes, such as movement; so, just as happened historically strategic options tend to lessen as lines of communication extend. We also wanted to reflect the difficulties occasioned by a failure of logistical planning. It is for this reason that in *HtUwS* players are unable to simply remove and replace depots at will: the limit of only one depot removal per turn is intended to "punish" such failures. We like to think that these very simple mechanics serve to integrate the rules governing supply and movement in a way which encapsulate the key elements of strategic warfare during this period as well as the central role of logistics.

Every war has its share of individual brilliance and folly, heroism and cowardice, completely outside the military leader's control. Although minor in themselves, such actions might sometimes influence the overall course of events. The American Civil War was no exception. The Random Event Cards [RECs] which players lay each turn represent this meddling by the Gods of Chance. The sizable spanners which they might throw into the works include political interference such as when the president demands a military success to bolster moral on the civilian front, or a quarrel between two senior commanders delaying an advance, or draft riots necessitating the diversion of front-line troops. Sometimes, of course, the Gods might be kind such as when they provide extra resources or promote the exceptional bravery and élan of a cavalry regiment. And, sometimes they are neutral, reflecting the suffering visited upon both sides by diseases such as dysentery and typhoid.

In the sense that the participants did not change and non-belligerents had relatively little influence upon strategy, simulating the American Civil War was fairly straight-forward. Both sides fought to the end with no quarter asked or given. The occasional and fairly tangential involvement of other powers – Britain, France and Mexico – can be accommodated within RECs. However, we decided to include two "what ifs": the possibility that Kentucky de facto sides with the Union

later than it did historically; and, that the European powers provide some support, primarily naval, to the Confederacy. These possibilities can produce some interesting effects in terms of how the game plays.

In the broadest terms, the course of *HtUwS* tends to follow that of the war itself. Strategically, the North is generally on the offensive, with the South doing its utmost to defend the Confederacy. Within this framework both sides have a number of strategic options. At various stages of the game, for example, attack can be the best form of defense for the Confederate player as raids into Union territory can pre-empt major offensives by the North. Alternatively, he/she can focus exclusively upon preserving his/her forces and creating a formidable perimeter around the Confederacy which the North will find difficult to breach. The challenge for the Northern player is to consider how best to invade the South. He/she can do his aggressively and run the risk of leaving the Union forces open to devastating counter-attacks which disrupt their lines of supply; or, methodically, with the attendant danger of running out of time. The final few turns of a close game can be truly dramatic as each player desperately tries to defend or capture sufficient territory to secure overall victory. In play-testing such victories have been snatched from the jaws of defeat many times as one player or the other is able to seize the final city necessary to win the game or to sever the enemy's lines of communication and prevent his/her opponent from doing so.

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